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Abstract
We derive axiomatically a model in which the Decision Maker can exhibit simulta-
neously both the Allais and the Ellsberg paradoxes in the standard setup of Anscombe
and Aumann (1963). Using the notion of ‘subjective’, or ‘outcome’ mixture of Ghi-
rardato et al. (2003), we define a novel form of hedging for objective lotteries, and
introduce a novel axiom which is a generalized form of preferences for hedging. We
show that this axiom, together with other standard ones, is equivalent to a represen-
tation in which the agent reacts to ambiguity using multiple priors like the MaxMin
Expected Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), generating an Ellsberg-like
behavior, while at the same time, she treats also objective lotteries as ‘ambiguous ob-
jects,’ and use a fixed (and unique) set of priors to evaluate them – generating an
Allais-like behavior. We show that this representation is equivalent to one in which
the agent evaluates lotteries using a set of concave rank-dependent utility functionals.
A comparative notion of preference for hedging is also introduced.
JEL: D81
Keywords: Allais Paradox, Ellsberg Paradox, Hedging, Multiple Priors, Subjective
Mixture, Probability Weighting, Rank Dependent Expected Utility
1 Introduction
In last decades a large number of empirical and theoretical work has been devoted to the
study of two ‘paradoxes’ in individual decision making: the Allais paradox in the case of
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objective probabilities, and the Ellsberg paradox in the case of subjective probabilities. To-
gether, they constitute two of the most widely studied and robust phenomena in experimen-
tal economics and psychology of individual behavior. Following this overwhelming evidence,
two vast literatures have sprung up. The first focuses on generalizing models of (objective)
Expected Utility to accommodate Allais-type behavior, while the second aimed at general-
izing models of (subjective) Expected Utility to accommodate Ellsberg-type behavior – or
‘ambiguity aversion.’
Despite the existence of large number of theoretical models that addresses each of the
two phenomena separately, however, far less attention has been devoted to the study of
the relation between them. Models that study Allais-like behavior usually only look at
objective probabilities, thus not allowing for ambiguity. At the same time, models that study
Ellsberg-like behavior either do not consider objective probabilities at all or, if they do, they
explicitly assume that the agent follows Expected Utility to assess objective lotteries.1 In
particular, to our knowledge there is no model that studies a decision maker who exhibit both
tendencies at the same time in a unified way, at least in standard setups. (See Section 3 for
more discussion.) This is surprising given the existence of an least one intuitive connection
between these two phenomena: loosely speaking, one might expect a decision maker who
is ‘pessimistic’ about the outcome of risky and uncertain events to display both types of
behavior at the same time.2 This conceptual similarity, moreover, is coupled by a technical
one: both phenomena can been as violation of some form of linearity/independence of the
preferences.
In this paper we develop axiomatically a model which allows for both Allais and Ellsberg-
type behavior in the standard Anscombe and Aumann (1963) setup, and we do so by demon-
strating a formal link between these two phenomena. Following the intuition of the charac-
terization of ambiguity aversion as a preference for hedging first suggested Schmeidler (1989),
we introduce a generalized notion of hedging that can be applied both to objective risk and
subjective uncertainty. We do so by using the concept of ‘outcome mixtures’ rather than
‘probability mixtures’ to define hedging. This allows to define a unique axiom, a generalized
preference for hedging, which leads to both an Allais and an Ellsberg-type behavior. In par-
ticular, we characterize a model in which the decision maker evaluates acts using multiple
priors, like in the MaxMin Expected Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), but
who will also use some ‘multiple priors’ to evaluate objective lotteries, distorting the original
probabilities – therefore treating objective lotteries as if they were ‘ambiguous objects.’
We then show how the same preferences can be alternatively represented by using a
distortion of probabilities that follows the Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) model
of Quiggin (1982). In particular, our agent will have a set of concave probability weighting
1Two exceptions are Klibanoff et al. (2005) and Drapeau and Kupper (2010). In the former, a corollary
of the main theorem generalizes the representation to the case of non-EU preferences on objective lotteries;
this representation, however, is not fully axiomatized, and does not model jointly the attitude towards risk
and uncertainty. Drapeau and Kupper (2010) allows for non-Expected Utility behavior on both dimensions
in the standard setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). However, as we shall discuss, they model violation
of Expected Utility which need not conform to the Allais paradox, but rather could exhibit the opposite
behavior.
2Such a link has been drawn by Wakker (1990), Chew and Wakker (1996), Wakker (1996), Chateauneuf
(1999), and Diecidue and Wakker (2001) in the context of rank-dependent utility, and also more recently
by Gumen et al. (2011).
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functions, and asses objective lotteries using a RDEU model with the worst probability
weighting. In Section 2.6.2 we show how this generalizes the RDEU model with concave
probability weighting, allowing us the flexibility to model behaviors which, although in line
with intuitive notions of ‘pessimism,’ could not be captured by RDEU.
1.1 Overview of Main Results
One of the central contributions of the paper is to provide a concept of ‘preference for hedg-
ing’ that explains both Allais-style behavior for objective risk, and Ellsberg-style behavior
for (subjective) uncertainty. Indeed the link between the latter and hedging in well-known,
following the Uncertainty Aversion axiom introduced in Schmeidler (1989). At the same
time, however, this is usually done by defining hedging using probability mixtures: the mix-
ture between two acts f and g is generally defined as an act that returns in each state a
probabilistic mixture between the outcome obtained of f and g in that state. A preference
for hedging then implies that, if an agent is indifferent between any two acts, she should
rank the probability mixture between them as at least as good. While an identical notion
could be applied directly to objective lotteries, it would not capture our intuition of what is
driving Allais-like violations of expected utility: a strict preference for hedging would require
a strict preference for the probabilistic mixture of a lottery and its certainty-equivalent over
the certainty equivalent itself, contradicting the preference for certainty that is often claimed
to be driving Allais style behavior.
We therefore define hedging using the concept of outcome mixtures : we follow Ghirardato
et al. (2003) to define outcome-mixture of consequences, and then introduce a novel notion
of outcome-mixture of lotteries. To illustrate, suppose that we have two outcomes, $0 and
$10, and that we want to ‘mix’ them with weight 0.5, in the sense of identifying a prospect
whose utility lies exactly halfway between that of the two original points. The standard way
to do this is to use a probability mixture, i.e. create a lottery p that returns $0 or $10 with
equal probability: under Expected Utility, the utility of p is exactly half-way between the
utility of $0 and that of $10. Instead, here we use the idea of an outcome mixture, which
identifies some element in the space of outcomes that has a utility exactly in the middle of
$0 and $10. If we knew that the utility is a linear, we could simply use the outcome exactly
in the middle – $5 in the example above. In general, of course, the utility will not be linear,
and in the paper we will adapt the methodology developed by Ghirardato et al. (2003) for
the case of ambiguity to identify the correct outcome. It turns out that their approach works
naturally in our setup as well, and we shall denote z = 1
2
x ⊕ 1
2
y the outcome mixture thus
obtained.
Once outcome mixtures are defined, the key passage of our analysis is to extend this notion
of outcome mixture between two prizes to a notion of outcome mixture between two lotteries.
First, consider the mixture between a lottery p =
∑
x∈X p(x)x and a degenerate lottery that
returns the outcome y with probability 1. We can then define their mixture 1
2
p ⊕ 1
2
y as
the lottery that returns, with the same probabilities as p, a mixture of the outcomes of p
with y, using the outcome mixture defined above. Next, we define the mixture between two
non-degenerate lotteries. The key observation for this case will be that there will be many
possible such mixtures. To illustrate, consider for simplicity the lottery p which returns $10
and $0 with probability 1
2
, and let us think about the all the mixtures of p with itself, i.e.
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with a second lottery that returns $10 and $0 with probability 1
2
. Recall that the idea here
is to mix the outcomes that this lottery returns. One way to do it would be to mix $0 with
$0 and $10 with $10: we would obtain exactly the lottery p. However, we could also mix
$0 with $10, and $10 with $0, and we would obtain a lottery that returns 1
2
$10⊕ 1
2
$0 with
probability 1 (a degenerate lottery). All of these lotteries could be seen as mixtures between
p and itself. We can define the mixture between any lotteries p and q in the same way, and
we denote by
⊕1
2
p,q the set of all such mixtures. Finally, once we have defined the mixture
between two lotteries, we can also define the mixture between two acts, simply point-wise:
for any two acts f and g, we define
⊕1
2
f,g as the set of all acts that could be obtained by
mixing in every state of the world the lottery returned by f and the lottery returned by g
in that state.
Now that we have outcome mixtures of lotteries, we can introduce our main axiom,
Hedging, which, we will argue, generates both Allais-type and Ellsberg-type behavior. To
illustrate, let us go back to our lottery p which returns $10 and $0 with probability 1
2
, and
think about its mixtures with itself: we have seen that these include p itself, but also the
degenerate lottery that returns 1
2
$10⊕ 1
2
$0. The key observation is that, loosely speaking, all
of these lotteries are (weakly) more ‘concentrated towards the mean’ (in utility terms) than
p, while preserving expected utility. In the extreme case, this gives us the degenerate lottery
1
2
$10 ⊕ 1
2
$0. A ‘pessimistic’ agent should like this reduction of the variance, this ‘pulling
towards the mean’ – and should exhibit a preference for hedging. If we extend this idea to
acts, moreover, then hedging acquires also the additional advantage of mixing the outcomes
in each state, just like in the case of Uncertainty Aversion in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) –
a reduction of subjective uncertainty which pessimistic subjects should also like. Thus, our
axiom will say that if we have two acts that are indifferent to each other, then any third act
that could be obtained as a hedging between the first two should ranked as at last as good
as them.
The main theorem of the paper will then show that, in a standard Anscombe-Aumann
setup, this axioms, together with other standard ones,3 is equivalent to the existence of a
representation for the preferences of the decision maker with the following components 1) a
utility function u on the prizes, 2) a convex and compact set of probability measures Π on
the finite set of states of the world Ω, and 3) a convex and compact set of Borel probability
measures Φ on [0, 1], which contain the Lebesgue measure `.4 Our agent evaluates acts in a
way very similar to the MaxMin Expected Utility (MMEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989): she calculates the utility of each act by combining the utility that what this act
returns in each state using the worst of the priors in Π. That is,  is represented by
V (f) := min
pi∈Π
∫
Ω
pi(ω) U(f(ω))dω,
where U : ∆(X) → R represents her evaluation of lotteries in ∆(X) – precisely as in the
3In particular, we posit Continuity; (standard) Monotonicity; First Order Stochastic Dominance; one
axiom that guarantee that the notion of ⊕ is well defined; one axiom with the same idea of the Certainty-
independence axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), but where mixtures defined using outcome mixtures
instead of probability mixtures, and using degenerate lotteries instead of constant acts.
4Moreover, every φ ∈ Φ is atomless and mutually absolutely continuous with respect to `.
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MMEU model. Where our model differs, however, is on how this U is computed for each
lottery. In particular, for any lottery p in ∆(X) our agent acts as follows. First, she maps
each lottery into an act defined on a hypothetical urn which contains a measure 1 of ‘balls,’
and in which each ball is associated to a certain prize preserving the correct probabilities.
(We call this a measure-preserving map γ.) Put another way, our decision maker acts as if
the lottery will be actualized by the drawing of a ball from an urn, with the the fraction of
balls giving a particular prize equal to the probability of that prize under p. (For example,
when she faces the lottery p = 1
2
x+ 1
2
y, she could think that at some point this lottery will
be executed by taking some urn with many balls and saying, for example, that if one the
first half of the balls is extracted, then the outcome is x, while if one of the second half is
extracted, the outcome is y.) It is then easy to see that an expected utility agent would use
the uniform prior on [0, 1] to evaluate such acts – the Lebesgue measure `. By contrast, we
capture the notion of pessimism by considering an agent who has a set of priors on [0, 1],
which contains `, and who evaluates lotteries using the worst one of them. That is, we have
U(p) := min
φ∈Φ
∫
[0,1]
φ(s) u(γ(p)(s))ds.
This representation as an intuition very similar to MMEU: it amounts to saying that agent
treats each objective lottery as an act, and she is ambiguity averse in her dealing with it.
Like in MMEU, then, this ambiguity aversion is captured by the multiplicity of priors. We
then show how this representation is fully compatible with the Allais paradox: intuitively,
degenerate lotteries cannot be distorted, as any prior on [0, 1] must still integrate to 1; on the
other hand non-degenerate ones can, and they will receive an utility always (weakly) lower
than they would have under Expected Utility, because ` must belong to the set of priors, so
if the representation uses a different one it must be because it assigns a lower utility.
One feature of the representation above is that the decision maker might distort objec-
tive probabilities when she evaluates lotteries. However, she does so following a procedure
which is rather different from others suggested in the literature: instead of distorting the
distribution of the lottery, she maps it into an imaginary act on the space [0, 1] and uses
distorted (i.e. non-uniform) probabilities over this state space. A natural question is then
to ask if there existed an alternative, and equivalent representation in which the decision
maker followed the more traditional path of distorting the commutative distribution of the
lottery. This is the procedure followed by one of the most well-known model used to study
violations of Expected Utility on objective lotteries: the Rank Dependent Expected Util-
ity Model (henceforth RDEU) of Quiggin (1982). (See Wakker (1994), Nakamura (1995),
Chateauneuf (1999), Starmer (2000), Abdellaoui (2002), Kobberling and Wakker (2003) and
the many references therein.) According to this model, the agent uses a rule similar to
Expected Utility, but applies a weighting function on the cumulative distribution of each
lottery. Depending on the shape of this function, the behavior of the agent can be either in
line with certainty bias a’ la Allais (concave weighting), or the opposite (convex weighting).
Our main theorem will then show that we can, in fact, find a representation of this kind: we
will show that the representation above (and the axioms) are equivalent to one in which the
agent has a utility function and a set of priors over Π , but also a set of concave weighting
functions on the cumulative distributions. She then ranks acts using the worst of the priors
in Π, just like the previous representation, but she evaluates objective lotteries using the
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RDEU representation with the worst of the weighting functions in the set. It turns out that
our model is a strict generalization of the RDEU one with a concave distortion; we refer to
Section 3 for more discussion.
Finally, we note that the comparative notion ambiguity aversion of Ghirardato and Mari-
nacci (2002) applies naturally in this setup, and leads to a the following representation: an
agent who is more attracted to certainty (in the sense of their definition) admits a represen-
tation with a weakly larger set of priors Π on Ω, and also a weakly larger set of priors Φ on
[0, 1].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal setup,
the axioms, and the representation theorem. Section 3 discusses the relevant literature.
Section 4 concludes. The proofs appear in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Formal Setup
We consider a standard Anscombe-Aumann setup with the additional restrictions that the
set of consequences is both connected and compact. More precisely, consider a finite (non-
empty) set Ω of states of the world, an algebra Σ of subsets of Ω called events, and a (non-
empty) set X of consequences, which we assume to be a connected and compact subset of a
metric space.5 As usual, by ∆(X) we define the set of simple probability measures over X,
while by F we denote the set of simple Anscombe-Aumann acts: finite-valued, Σ-measurable
functions f : Ω → ∆(X). We metrize ∆(X) in such a way that metric convergence on it
coincides with weak convergence of Borel probability measures. Correspondingly, we metrize
F using point-wise convergence.
We will also use some additional standard notation. For every consequence x ∈ X we
denote by δx the degenerate lottery in ∆(X) which returns x with probability 1. For any
x, y ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1), we denote by αx+(1−α)y the lottery that returns x with probability
α, and y with probability (1− α). Moreover, for any p ∈ ∆(X), we denote by cp, certainty
equivalent of p, the elements of X such that p ∼ δcp . For any p ∈ ∆(X), with the usual
slight abuse of notation we denote the constant act in F such that p(ω) = p for all ω ∈ Ω.
Finally, given some p, q ∈ ∆(X) and some E ∈ Σ, xEy denotes the acts that yield outcome
x if E is realized, and y otherwise.
Our primitive is a complete, non degenerate preference relation  on F , whose symmetric
and asymmetric components are denoted ∼ and .
5It is standard practice to generalize our analysis to the more general case in which X is a connected
and compact topological space with topology τ . Similarly, our analysis could be also be easily generalized
to the case in which the state space is infinite, although in this case the Continuity axiom would have to be
adapted: see Section 2.2.1, specifically the discussion after Axiom 3.
6
2.2 Axioms and Subjective and Objective Mixtures
2.2.1 Basic Axioms
We start with imposing some basic axioms on our preference relation. First of all, we
postulate that it respects First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) on objective lotteries.
In particular, we use the following standard definition.6
Definition 1. For any p, q ∈ ∆(X), we say that p First Order Stochastically Dominates q,
denoted pDFOSD q, if p({x : δx  δz}) ≥ q({x : δx  δz}) for all z ∈ X. We say pBFOSD q,
if pDFOSD q and p({x : δx  δz}) > q({x : δx  δz}) for some z ∈ X.
We then impose that our preference relation respects FOSD.
A.1 (FOSD). For any p, q ∈ ∆(X), if pDFOSD q then p  q, and if pBFOSD q then p  q.
We next impose the standard monotonicity postulate for acts: if an act f returns a
consequence which is better than what another act g returns in every state of the world,
then f must be preferred to g.
A.2 (Monotonicity). For any f, g ∈ F if f(ω)  g(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, then f  g.
Next, since we are after a representation theorem we need to posit a form of continuity
of the preferences.7 8
A.3 (Continuity).  is continuous: the sets {g ∈ F : g  f} and {g ∈ F : g  f} are
closed for all f ∈ F .
In the standard development of subjective Expected Utility theory, to the axioms above
one would add the Independence axiom of Anscombe and Aumann (1963).9 This axiom,
6Indeed, since since our set of consequences X is a generic (compact and connected) set, then the usual
definition of FOSD designed for R would not apply. The definition that follows is a standard generalization
which uses, as a ranking for X, the ranking derived from the preferences on degerenate lotteries. It is easy
to see that this definition coincides with the standard definition of FOSD in the special case in which X ⊆ R
and we had δx  δy iff x ≥ y for all x, y ∈ X.
7We should emphasize that, although the following axiom is entirely standard, it stronger than the
Archemedean Continuity usually assumed in this literature, which only posits that the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] :
αf + (1− α)g  h} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : h  αf + (1− α)g} are closed.
8Although we assume that the state space Ω is finite, as we mentioned before our analysis could easily
be extended to the general case of an infinite state space. To do this, however, we would have to adapt
the Continuity axiom by requiring Archimedean continuity on acts, and full continuity on lotteries. That
is, we would require: 1) {α ∈ [0, 1] : αf + (1 − α)g  h} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : h  αf + (1 − α)g} are
closed; and 2) {q ∈ ∆(X) : q  p} and {q ∈ ∆(X) : q  p} are closed for all p ∈ ∆(X). We would then
obtain representations identical to ours, but in which the measures over Ω are just finitely additive and not
necessarily countably additive. If, in addition, we wanted also to obtain countable additivity, we would have
to further assume Arrow’s Monotone Continuity Axiom (see Chateauneuf et al. (2005)).
9The Independence axioms posits that for every f, g, h ∈ F , and for every α ∈ [0, 1]
f  g ⇔ αf + (1− α)h  αg + (1− α)h.
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together with Axiom 1-3, would have two implications: 1) that the decision maker is a Ex-
pected Utility maximizer with respect to objective lotteries; 2) that the decision maker is a
Subjective Expected Utility Maximizer with respect to acts. (See Anscombe and Aumann
(1963).) As we are interested in violations of both subjective and objective expected util-
ity maximization, this would then be too strong for our analysis. To accommodate for an
Ellsberg-type behavior, in the literature on ambiguity aversion, an alternative much weaker
axiom has been suggested: Risk Independence, which postulates independence only for ob-
jective lotteries.10 This axiom is imposed by virtually all the models defined in the setup
of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). However, since we are explicitly aiming to model Allais-
style violations of objective expected utility, also this weaker axiom is too strong for our
analysis. We will therefore have to depart radically from this approach, and from the use of
probability mixtures, and rather use the alternative notion of outcome mixtures as we shall
define below.
Before we proceed, however, we posit a much more basic form of coherence of the prefer-
ences, which will not rule out Allais-like behavior while at the same time guaranteeing that
minimum amount of coherence that we will need in our analysis. Consider some x, y, z′, z′′
such that z′ and z′′ are “in between” x and y. Then, consider the following two lotteries:
1
2
ce1
2
x+ 1
2
z′
+
1
2
ce1
2
y+ 1
2
z′′
and
1
2
ce1
2
x+ 1
2
z′′
+
1
2
ce1
2
y+ 1
2
z′
.
The only difference between them is that: in the former x is mixed with z′, and y with
z′′, and then they are mixed together; in the latter x is mixed first with z′′, and y with z′,
and then they are mixed together. In both cases, however, the only weights involved are
weights 1
2
, and x is always mixed with some element worst than it, while y is mixed with
some element better than it. The only difference is then in the ‘order’ of this mixture. Our
axiom then imposes that these two lotteries should be indifferent for the agent, who should
not care about such ‘order.’
A.4 (Objective Tradeoff-Consistency). For any x, y, z′, z′′ ∈ X such that δx  δz′  δy,
δx  δz′′  δy, and ce 1
2
r+ 1
2
s exists for r = x, y and s = z
′, z′′. Then, we have
1
2
ce1
2
x+ 1
2
z′
+
1
2
ce1
2
y+ 1
2
z′′
∼ 1
2
ce1
2
x+ 1
2
z′′
+
1
2
ce1
2
y+ 1
2
z′
.
The axiom above is clearly implied by Risk Independence – following which both lotteries
would be indifferent to a lottery that returns each option with probability 1
4
. At the same
time, it is much weaker than it. For example, it is easy to see that it is compatible with the
10The Risk Independence Axiom posits that for every f, g, h ∈ F , and for every α ∈ [0, 1]
f  g ⇔ αf + (1− α)h  αg + (1− α)h.
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behavior of an agent who evaluates each lottery of the form 1
2
a + 1
2
b, where δa  δb, by the
functional γ(1
2
)u(a)+(1−γ(1
2
))u(b), where γ(1
2
) could be any number between 0 and 1 – the
elements γ(1
2
) would ‘cancel out’ leading to the indifference required by the axiom. That is,
Axiom 4 does not rule out forms of probability weighting.
Axioms of this form are not uncommon in the literature: in particular, this is an adap-
tation of the E-Substitution Axiom in Ghirardato et al. (2001) for the case of objective
lotteries. In fact, following this literature it is straightforward to show how Axioms 1-4 are
enough to guarantee that the representation hinted to in the previous paragraph is not only
sufficient, but also necessary. The following Lemma is a trivial consequence of (Ghirardato
et al., 2001, Lemma 1). (The proof is therefore omitted.)
Lemma 1. A preference relation satisfies Axioms 1-4 if and only if there exists a cardinally
unique utility function u : X → R and a parameter γ(1
2
) ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any x, y, z, w ∈
X with δx  δy and δz  δw, we have that 12x + 12y  12z + 12w if, and only if, γ(12)u(x) +
(1− γ(1
2
))u(y) ≥ γ(1
2
)u(z) + (1− γ(1
2
))u(w).
2.2.2 Probability-Mixtures and Outcomes-Mixtures
We now turn to discuss one of the central the notions of our analysis: outcome-mixtures
of lotteries. The intuition is the following. To be able to define behaviorally a notion of
aversion to ‘exposure to risk,’ it will be useful to define a notion of hedging between lotteries:
a ‘mixture’ between what the two lotteries return constructed in such a way that the utility
of this mixture is ‘in between’ that of original lotteries. The traditional approach to do this is
to define this mixture by creating a more complicated lottery that returns each prize x ∈ X
with a probability which is a convex combination of the probabilities assigned to x by the
original lottery. (We shall refer to these mixtures as probability-mixtures.) Unfortunately,
however, this approach would not work for our analysis: the mixture is created by changing
the probabilities, and our agent might not be neutral to it. For example, any mixture
of this kind between two degenerate lotteries δx and δy becomes a non-degenerate lottery,
introducing some exposure to risk which wasn’t there before. And since our agents need
not follow Expected Utility and are potentially averse to exposure to risk, then this kind of
mixture won’t be appropriate for us.
Instead of probability mixtures, in this paper we will use the alternative notion of
outcome-mixtures of lotteries. We will first of all follow the literature and define the simpler
notion of outcome-mixture for consequences;11 then, we extend this idea to a mixture over
lotteries. To illustrate, consider first two outcomes x, y ∈ X. A probability-mixture with
weight α between them is the lottery that returns x with probability α and y with probabil-
ity (1− α). Under Expected Utility, such probability mixture has a utility which is exactly
half-way between that of x and y. By contrast, an outcome-mixture between x and y is
an outcome z in X that has has a utility which is exactly in the middle between that of x
and y. The whole point now is to understand: 1) if such z exists, and 2) how to identify
it. Indeed if we knew that the utility function of the agent were linear on X ⊆ R, we could
11Similar approaches to define mixtures of consequences were used in Wakker (1994), Kobberling and
Wakker (2003), Ghirardato et al. (2001, 2003), and in the many references therein. More precisely, in what
follows we adapt the approach Ghirardato et al. (2003) to the case of objective probabilities.
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simply take the element 1
2
x + 1
2
y. But of course this is in general not true. However, if the
set of consequences X is connected, then Ghirardato et al. (2003) propose a technique which
allows us to elicit this element anyway. In what follows we adapt their technique, originally
developed for Savage acts, to the case objective lotteries with weight 1
2
.
Definition 2. For any x, y ∈ X, if x  y we say that z ∈ X is a 1
2
-mixture of x and y, if
δx  δz  δy and
1
2
x+
1
2
y ∼ 1
2
c 1
2
x+ 1
2
z +
1
2
c 1
2
z+ 1
2
y. (1)
We denote z by 1
2
x⊕ 12y.
The rationale is the following. Consider some x, y, z ∈ X such that δx  δz  δy. Suppose
now also that (1) holds. Then, we know that the agent is indifferent between either receiving
the mixture between x and y, or first taking the mixture between x and z, and then the
mixture between z and y – which would hold if z had a utility exactly half-way between that
of x and y. This is even more explicit if we consider the representation in Lemma 1: it is
immediate to see that we must have that we have that u(z) = 1
2
u(x) + 1
2
u(z) if and only if
we had δx  δz  δy and (1) holds. Thanks for our structural assumption, this notion is
well-defined: since X is a connected set and u is continuous, this means that, under Axioms
1-4, for any x, y ∈ X there must exist some z ∈ X such that z = 1
2
x ⊕ 12y. We refer to
Ghirardato et al. (2001, 2003) for further discussion.
We denote ⊕ using the preferences as a subscript to emphasize how such outcome-
mixture depends on the original preference relation. However, in most of the following
discussion, except in Section 2.8, we drop the subscript for simplicity of notation. Once
preferences averages between two elements are defined as above, we can then define any
other mixture λx ⊕ (1 − λ)y for any dyadic rational λ ∈ (0, 1), simply by applying the
definition above iteratively.12
Definition 2 defines the outcome-mixture between two consequences in X. One of the
key (and, to our knowledge, novel) contributions of our paper is to extend this notion to
mixture of lotteries and of acts. Let us start from the simplest case: two degenerate lotteries.
Indeed their mixture can be easily defined following the notion above: for any two x, y ∈ X,
the mixture between δx and δy will be the degenerate lottery δλx+(1−λ)y. We can similarly
define the notion of mixture between a degenerate lottery δx and a generic lottery p ∈ ∆(X):
replace what p returns with the ⊕-mixture with x, keeping the probabilities constant. That
is, we have that, for ant p ∈ ∆(X) y ∈ X and α :
α(
∑
p(xi)δxi)⊕ (1− α)δy =
∑
p(xi)δαxi⊕(1−α)y.
Slightly more complicated, however, is to define outcome-mixture of two lotteries, mainly
because there are many possible ways to do it. To see why, consider two lotteries p = 1
2
x+ 1
2
y
12Any λ ∈ [0, 1] is dyadic rational if for some finite N , we have λ = ∑Ni=1 ai/2i, where ai ∈ (0, 1)
for every i and aN = 1. Then, we use λx ⊕ (1 − λ)y as a short-hand for the iterated preference average
1
2z1⊕ 12 (. . . ( 12zN−1⊕ 12 ( 12zN⊕ 12y)) . . . ), where for every i, zi = x if ai = 1 and zi = y otherwise. Alternatively,
we could have defined λx ⊕ λy for any real number λ ∈ (0, 1), by defining it for dyadic rationals first, and
then using continuity of the preferences to define it for the whole (0, 1). The two approaches are clearly
identical in our axioms structure; we choose to use the most restrictive definition to state the axioms in the
weakest form we are aware of.
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and q = 1
2
z + 1
2
w. How can define a mixture between p and q? We could combine x with z,
and y with w, and we obtain the lottery 1
2
(1
2
x ⊕ 1
2
z) + 1
2
(1
2
y ⊕ 1
2
w). Or, we could combine
x with w, and y with z, and then obtain a different lottery. But we can also see p and q as
p = 1
4
x+ 1
4
x+ 1
4
y+ 1
4
y and p = 1
4
z+ 1
4
z+ 1
4
w+ 1
4
w, and combine them in yet other ways. Or,
decompose them in different ways, to find yet many other combinations. All of this shows
that there is a large number of ways to combine these lotteries, and for any two lotteries
p, q ∈ ∆(X) we denote by ⊕12p,q the set of all such mixtures between p and q and weight
1
2
. Formally,
⊕1
2
p,q is constructed as follows. Consider any lottery p and q, and notice that,
because both are simple lotteries, we could always find some x1, . . . xn, y1, . . . , yn ∈ X, and
some γ1, . . . , γn ∈ [0, 1] such that p =
∑n
i=1 γixi, q =
∑n
i=1 γiyi.
13 Then, the set
⊕1
2
p,q will be
the set of all combinations r such that r =
∑n
i=1 γi(
1
2
xi ⊕ 12yi).14
Alternatively, we could interpret the set
⊕1
2
p,q as follows.15 Under the assumption that our
agent has a well-defined utility function over the set X, we could see each lottery p ∈ ∆(X)
as a random variable Vp that assigns to each event in [0, 1] a certain utility, i.e. p = Vp :
[0, 1]→ R. Since the ⊕-mixture is nothing but a mixture of the utilities, then the mixtures
in
⊕1
2
p,q could be seen as the mixtures between the random variables corresponding to p and
q. But of course to define the mixture between two random variable we need to know their
covariance. The set
⊕1
2
p,q could then be seen as the set of all 12 -mixtures of the random
variable corresponding to p and q for any possible covariance. The multiplicity of mixtures
could then be seen as stemming from the multiple possible covariances that could be found.
Finally, we define the notion of outcome-mixture for acts. As standard, we do it point-
wise: an act h is a 1
2
-mixture between two acts f and g if, and only if, h(ω) ∈⊕12f(ω),g(ω) for
all ω ∈ Ω. We denote ⊕12f,g the set of all outcome-mixtures of two acts.
2.2.3 Main Axioms
Now that we are endowed with the notions of outcome mixtures, we can use them to define
the two central axioms of the paper. We start from a form of positive homogeneity and
translation invariance much in the spirit of the Certainty-Independence axiom of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989):16 when two acts are mixed with a ‘neutral’ element, their ranking should
not change. As opposed to Certainty-independence, however, the ‘neutral element’ will not
only be a constant acts, but a degenerate lottery, which is ‘neutral’ from the point of view
of both risk and ambiguity. Moreover, we will use outcome-mixtures instead of probability
13For example, the lotteries p = 12x+
1
2y and q =
1
3z+
2
3w could be both written as p =
1
3x+
1
6x+
1
6y+
1
3y
and q = 13z +
1
6w +
1
6w +
1
3w.
14That is, we have
⊕ 1
2
p,q := {r ∈ ∆(X) : ∃x1, . . . xn, y1, . . . , yn ∈ X,∃γ1, . . . , γn ∈ [0, 1] such that p =∑n
i=1 γixi, q =
∑n
i=1 γiyi, and r =
∑n
i=1 γi(
1
2xi ⊕ 12yi)}.
15We thank Fabio Maccheroni for suggesting the following interpretation.
16Recall that a preference relation satisfies Certainty-Indepedence if for any f, g ∈ F , and for any p ∈ ∆(X)
and λ ∈ (0, 1), we have f  g iff λf + (1− λ)p  λg + (1− λ)p.
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ones, because our agent could have non-linear reactions to probability mixtures.17
A.5 (Degenerate-Independence (DI)). For any f, g ∈ F , dyadic α ∈ (0, 1), and for any
x ∈ X,
f  g ⇔ αf ⊕ (1− α)δx  αg ⊕ (1− α)δx.
Finally, we posit our last and most important axiom: preference for hedging. Let us
develop the intuition for it with a simple example. Consider some lottery p = 1
2
x+ 1
2
y, and
the lottery r that could be obtained by mixing p with itself, i.e. r ∈ ⊕ 12p,p. We would like
to argue that any agent who is, in some sense, ‘averse to exposure to risk,’ should rank r
as at least as good as p. To wit, notice how r is constructed. On the one hand, we could
have that x is mixed with x, and y is mixed with y, generating r = p – so r is at least
as good as p. On the other hand, r could be obtained by mixing x and y, and y with x
– giving us r = δ1
2
x⊕1
2
y
. That is, r would become a degenerate lottery centered exactly at
the prize the utility of which is exactly in the middle between that of x and y. An agent
who is attracted to certainty, and who dislikes exposure to risk, will then like r at least as
much as p. A similar argument would naturally hold for any other way of constructing r:
for example, we could have r = 1
4
x+ 1
2
δ1
2
x⊕1
2
y
+ 1
4
y, which once again will be at least as good
as p for any agent who dislikes exposure to risk. The intuition here is simple: by the process
of hedging, the agent could mix some good and some bad outcomes, ‘pulling them towards
the center,’ reducing the exposure to risk and the variability that she is subject to (in terms
of utility). This means that an agent who is attracted towards such reduction should be
attracted towards hedging.
A similar argument naturally applies to hedging between different lotteries. To wit,
consider two lotteries p = 1
2
x+ 1
2
y and q = 1
2
z+ 1
2
w, where x, z  y, w, and suppose that p is
indifferent to q. Take some r which could be obtained by mixing p and q with weight 1
2
, i.e.
r ∈⊕ 12p,q. Again, we would like to argue that an agent who is ‘averse to exposure to risk,’
should like r as at least as much as p and q. In particular, r can formed by the two ‘good’
elements with each other (x and z), and the two ‘bad’ ones (y and w) with each other. But
since p and q are indifferent to each other, then these mixture should not be worse for the
agent. However, r could be formed by mixing the good element in p with the bad element
in q, and vice-versa, giving us r = δ1
2
x⊕1
2
w
+ 1
2
δ1
2
y⊕1
2
z
. Again, in this case we would have
that the process of hedging is similar to ‘pulling extremes towards the center’, reducing the
variability: so an agent who is averse to this variability should not be averse to hedging.
This lead us to argue that if we wish to posit aversion to exposure to risk, we could posit
that for any p, q, r ∈ ∆(X) such that p ∼ q and r ∈⊕ 12p,q, we should have r  p ∼ q.
We now extend this argument to hedging between acts – thus far we have only discussed
hedging between lotteries (degenerate acts). For simplicity, consider now two non-degenerate
17It is not hard to see that this axiom is actually striclty weaker than Certainty-Independence. To wit,
notice that the latter implies that the agent satisfies standard independence on constant acts, which in turn
implies that probability mixtures and outcome are indifferent for her – we must have λf + (1 − λ)δx ∼
λf ⊕ (1 − λ)δx for all f ∈ F , x ∈ X, and λ ∈ (0, 1). But then, Certainty-Independence would naturally
imply the axiom below.
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acts f, g ∈ F such that f ∼ g and such that f(ω) and g(ω) are degenerate lotteries for all ω.
Now consider some h ∈⊕ 12f,g, and notice that we must have h(ω) = δ1
2
f(ω)⊕1
2
g(ω)
. Since there
are no lotteries involved, going from f and g to h does not reduce the exposure to risk, as
the hedging above did. At the same time, however, it will reduce the exposure to ambiguity
– this is identical in spirit to the hedging axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).18 An agent
who is not ambiguity seeking would then (weakly) prefer hedging, and she will rank h as at
least as highly as f and g. Combining the two arguments of attraction towards hedging for
lotteries and for acts, we then obtain the following axiom – the main postulate of the paper.
A.6 (Hedging). For any f, g ∈ F), and for any h ∈⊕ 12f,g, if f ∼ g, then h  f .
2.3 First Representation: subjective view of objective risk
We are now ready to introduce our first and main representation. To better express it,
however, it will be useful to define the notion of a measure-preserving map from lotteries
into acts on [0, 1]. The idea is simple: for every objective lottery p ∈ ∆(X), we can map
it to an act defined on the space [0, 1] that assigns to each state in [0, 1] a consequence in
X. It is as if the agent imagined that to determine the prize of the objective lottery p, an
imaginary ‘urn’ of size [0, 1] will be used: after assigning to each ball in this imaginary urn
a consequence in X, thus creating an act from [0, 1] to X, there will be an extraction which
will determine the final prize.19 For example, the lottery p = 1
2
x + 1
2
y could be mapped to
the act on [0, 1] that returns x after the states [0, 1
2
), and returns y after the states [1
2
, 1].
Indeed there are many possible such maps: the lottery above could just as easily be mapped
to the act that returns y to the states [0, 1
2
), and x to the states [1
2
, 1]. Of all the possible
maps, however, we focus only on those in which each lottery in ∆(X) is mapped to an act
such that the Lebesgue measure of the states which return a given prize is identical to the
probability assigned to that prize by the original lottery. We call these measure-preserving
maps.
Definition 3. We say that a function µ : ∆(X) → [0, 1]X is measure-preserving if for all
p ∈ ∆(X) and all x ∈ X, `(µ−1(x)) = p(x).
We can then introduce our first representation, the Multiple Priors-Multiple Distortions
representation.
Definition 4. Consider a complete and non-degenerate preference relation  on F . We
say that  admits a Multiple Priors and Multiple Distortions Representation (MP-MD)
(u,Π,Φ) if there there exists a continuous utility function u : X → R, a convex and compact
set of probability measures Π on Ω, and a convex and weak-compact set of Borel probability
measures Φ on [0, 1], which contains the Lebesgue measure ` and such that every φ ∈ Φ is
atomless and mutually absolutely continuous with respect to `, such that  is represented
18In fact, if, additionally, we apply risk independence, then preference for hedging in outcome mixtures is
identical to preference for hedging in probabilities.
19A visualization which is rather close to being true in most experimental settings.
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by the functional
V (f) := min
pi∈Π
∫
Ω
pi(ω) U(f(ω))dω.
where U : ∆(X)→ R is defined as
U(p) := min
φ∈Φ
∫
[0,1]
φ(s) u(γ(p)(s))ds
for any measure-preserving map γ : ∆(X)→ [0, 1]X .
In a Multiple Priors and Multiple Distortions Representation the decision maker is en-
dowed with three elements: a (continuous) utility function u; a set of priors Π over the states
in Ω, which is convex and (weak) compact; and a set of (Borel) priors Φ over [0, 1], which
is convex and (weak) compact, contains the Lebesgue measure `, and contains only priors
which are atom less and mutually absolutely continuous w.r.t. it. She then ranks acts as
follows. With respect to ambiguity, she behaves in a way which is conceptually identical
to how she would behave in the MaxMin Expect Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989): she has a set of priors Π on the states of the world, and she uses the worst one of
them to aggregate the utility assigned to each of the (objective) lotteries that the act return
in every state.
Where the model above differs from MMEU is in how the evaluation on objective lotteries
is done. Our agent, in fact, need not follow vNM Expected Utility to compute it. Rather,
first she maps each objective lottery into an act on the space [0, 1] (in a measure-preserving
fashion). It is easy to see that if she followed Expected Utility, she would then evaluates
each of these imaginary acts using the Lebesgue measure `. Instead, our agent has a set of
priors Φ over [0, 1], which includes `, and she uses the worst one of them to compute her
utility – much in line with the MMEU model. This will lead her to give a (weakly) lower
evaluation to each non-degenerate lottery, while keeping her evaluation of degenerate ones
the same. In fact, her behavior will coincide with Expected Utility only in the special case
in which Φ is a singleton – which, by construction, means that it contains only `.
Let us illustrate this intuition by means of a simple example, in which we consider an
approximation in which our urn contains only 100 balls (instead of a measure 1 of them).
Our DM acts as if the outcome of any lottery will be determined by drawing a ball from this
urn. However, it is as if the probability of drawing each ball is not necessarily 1
100
, but can
be larger or smaller depending on whether that ball is associated with a good or bad prize
– in other words, out agent acts as if she were ambiguity averse over these balls. Thus, the
lottery p = 1
2
$10 + 1
2
$0 might be mapped to an act such that balls 1-50 give $10 and balls
51-100 give $0. In this case, our DM would reduce the probabilities associated with balls
1-50, thinking that she is ‘unlucky’ and that the ‘good balls’ will not come out, while at the
same time raising the probabilities associated with balls 51-100, the ones associated with the
‘bad’ outcome.
This main feature of the model above, which sets is apart from the rest of the literature
on ambiguity, is that our agent treats objective probabilities like ‘ambiguous objects:’ it is
as if she mapped each lottery into an acts, and she were ambiguity averse over such acts,
following a procedure essentially identical to the MMEU model to evaluate them. That is,
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our decision maker is, in some sense, ambiguity averse towards objective lotteries, where
the degree of her aversion is given by the size of the set Φ. In turns, it is not hard to see
how, whenever Π and Φ are not singletons, our decision maker will have an ‘attraction’
towards certainty, and towards degenerate lotteries in particular. In fact, she discounts both
uncertainty and risk by using the worst prior in Π and, at the same time, the worst prior in
Φ. The objects which we can be sure are left unaffected are degenerate lotteries: we must
have that V (δx) = U(δx) = u(x) by construction. As we will see in Section 2.6.1, this will
allow our model to represent both the Ellsberg and the Allais paradoxes.
2.4 Second representation: minimal of RDEU
The Multiple Priors Multiple Distortions representation discussed in the previous paragraph
describes an agent who distorts objective probabilities by mapping lotteries into acts, and
treating such acts as ambiguous objects that she evaluates using multiple priors. This form
of distortion of probabilities seems very different from other established way to distort ob-
jective probabilities, such as the ones part of the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU)
representation, in which a ‘weighting function’ is applied to the cumulative distribution of
the objective lottery. One could therefore ask if an alternative representation could be found,
in which our decision maker follows a more standard procedure to distort probabilities.
We start from recall the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility model of Quiggin (1982) for
preferences over the lotteries in ∆(X).
Definition 5. We say that a function ψ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a probability weighting if it is
increasing and it is such that ψ(0) = 0, ψ(1) = 1. For every non-constant function u and
for every probability weighting ψ, we say that a function is a Rank-Dependent Expected
Utility function with utility u and weight ψ, denoted RDEUu,ψ, if, for any enumeration of
the elements of the support of p such that xi−1  xi for i = 2, . . . , |supp(p)|, we have
RDEUu,ψ(p) := ψ(p(x1))u(x1) +
n∑
i=2
[
ψ(
i∑
j=1
p(xj))− ψ(
i−1∑
j=1
p(xj))
]
u(xi). (2)
The main feature of the RDEU model is that the decision maker follows a procedure
similar to expected utility, except that she uses distorted probabilities. In particular, the
distortion comes from a probability weighting function which modifies the way the agent
treats the cumulative probability distribution of the lottery at hand. It is well-known that
the RDEU model has many desirable properties, such as preserving continuity (as long at the
probability weighting is continuous) and FOSD. Moreover, when the probability weighing
is linear, RDEU coincides with Expected Utility. Depending on the shape of φ, the model
allows both for an attraction towards certainty: when φ is concave it leads to an Allais-like
behavior; the opposite takes place when φ is convex. (We refer to Quiggin (1982), and also
Wakker (1994), Starmer (2000), Abdellaoui (2002), Kobberling and Wakker (2003) and the
many references therein.) The RDEU model is arguably the most well-known representation
used to study violations of Expected Utility on objective lotteries. The Cumulative Prospect
Theory model of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), for example, is built on its framework.
We can then write a representation similar to our previous one, but in which the Decision
Maker uses an RDEU functional to distort probabilities. Indeed since we have an model
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of Allais-like behavior, such functional will be concave, and since we have a MMEU-like
representation, we will have set of RDEU distortion the worst of which will be used by the
agent.
Definition 6. Consider a complete and non-degenerate preference relation  on F . We
say that  admits a Multiple Priors and Multiple Concave Rank-Dependent Representation
(MP-MC-RDEU) (u,Π,Ψ) if there there exists a continuous utility function u : X → R, a
convex and compact set of probability measures Π on Ω, and a convex, (point-wise) compact
set of differentiable and concave probability weightings Ψ such that  is represented by the
functional
V (f) := min
pi∈Π
∫
Ω
pi(ω) U(f(ω))dω.
where U : ∆(X)→ R is defined as
U(p) := min
ψ∈Ψ
RDEUu,ψ(p).
Just like in the MP-MD representation, in a Multiple Priors and Multiple Concave Rank-
Dependent Representation our agent has a set of probabilities which she uses to evaluate acts
following the MMEU model. Here, however, instead of having a set of priors over [0, 1], she
has a set of probability weights, and she will use the worst one of those in a RDEU functional
to evaluate objective risk. That is, our agent treats objective lotteries using the min of a set
of RDEU distortions. Moreover, notice two features of this set. First, it is composed only of
concave – hence pessimistic – distortions. Second, Ψ could also be a singleton: this means
that the RDEU model with concave distortion is a special case of the representation above.
(In Section 2.6.2 we discuss a comparison with RDEU more in detail.)
2.5 Representation Theorem
We are now ready to introduce our representation theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a complete and non-degenerate preference relation  on F . Then,
the following are equivalent
(1)  satisfies Axioms 1-6.
(2)  admits a Multiple Priors and Multiple Distortions Representation (u,Π,Φ).
(3)  admits a Multiple Priors and Multiple Concave RDEU Representation (u,Π,Ψ).
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation, Π and Φ are unique.
Theorem 1 shows that the axiomatic structure discussed above is equivalent to both
representations. That is, imposing a preference for (generalized) hedging, together with
our other more standard axioms, is tantamount to positing that the decision-maker has a
MMEU-like representation for her ranking of acts, but also that she has a subjective view
of objective risk, as it happens in a MP-MD representation, the components of which are
identified uniquely. Moreover, this itself is equivalent to the existence of an alternative
representation in which the agent evaluates objective lotteries using the min of a set of
concave RDEU.
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2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Our representations and the Allais Paradox
We now turn to describe how our model could generate certainty bias and an Allais-like
behavior. Intuitively, it is easy to see how both derive from the our main axiom, Axiom 6
(Hedging): for any x, y, z ∈ X such that u(z) = 1
2
u(x) + 1
2
u(y), we must have that δz 
1
2
x+ 1
2
y, leading to (weak) certainty bias. In turns, as we have seen our first representation
has a similar feature: while the evaluation of degenerate lotteries is not distorted (i.e. we
must have V (δx) = U(δx) = u(x)), that of non-degenerate ones could be reduced when the
decision maker uses some prior φ which returns a lower amount than the Lebesgue measure
`. An identical argument applies also to our second representation.
Similarly, it is easy to see how the choice pattern of the Allais experiment could be accom-
modated by our model: for example, recall that a special case of our second representation is
the RDEU model with concave distortions, which is well-known to allow for it. Importantly,
moreover, we will now show how our model not only is able to accommodate for Allais-like
behavior, but that it rules out the possibility of an opposite preference. To wit, consider the
following four lotteries: p1 = $1, p2 = .01 · $0 + .89 · $1 + .1 · $x, p3 = .89 · 0$ + .11 · $1, and
p4 = .9 · $0 + .1 · $y. Recall that the Allais experiment asked to compare lotteries like the
ones above but in which x and y were equal to each other and set to $5, and then observed
the first preferred to the second, but the fourth preferred to the third. Let us now instead
choose x and y in such a way to make p1 ∼ p2 and p3 ∼ p4. Then, we have a choice pattern
which conforms with ‘Allais’ if and only if x ≥ y. We will now prove that this must be the
case for any MP-MD representation (u,Π,Φ); for simplicity we assume that u is linear.
Define the following three events on the unit interval: E1 = [0, 0.89), E2 = [0.89, 090),
E3 = (0.90, 1]. Then, consider the (measure preserving) map from lotteries into acts on [0, 1]
defined by the following table:
E1 E2 E3
p1 $1 $1 $1
p2 $1 $0 $x
p3 $0 $1 $1
p4 $0 $0 $y
Let α be the smallest weight put on E3 by any prior in Φ, and β be the smallest weight
put on E2 by one of the priors for which φ(E2) = α. Notice first of all that we must have
u(p2) ≤ (1 − α − β) + αx, since p2 could be evaluated using the prior above or a worse
one, so 1 = u(p1) = u(p2) ≤ (1 − α − β) + αx, hence α+βα ≤ x. Notice also that we must
have u(p4) = αy, and u(p3) ≤ min(0.11, α + β).20 Suppose first that we have α + β ≤ 0.11.
Then, we have αy = u(p4) = u(p3) ≤ α + β, hence y ≤ α+βα , which means x ≥ y as desired.
Suppose instead that α+ β > 0.11. This means that we have αy = u(p4) = u(p3) ≤ 0.11, so
y ≤ 0.11
α
. Since x ≥ α+β
α
and α + β > 0.11 we have x > 0.11
α
, so x > y as sought.
20Notice that we know that u(p3) ≤ 0.11 since Φ contains the Lebesgue measure.
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2.6.2 Comparison with RDEU
As evident from the existence of a Multiple Priors and Multiple Concave RDEU represen-
tation, our model is much related to Rank-Dependent Expected Utility. In fact, if we focus
on the special case in which |Ω| = 1, our model becomes a model of preferences over (vNM)
lotteries, and it can be seen as one in which the agent has a set of concave probability weight-
ings, and uses the worst of them to evaluate objective lotteries using the RDEU functional
form. Since our set of probability weightings could be a singleton, moreover, then the RDEU
model with concave distortions becomes a special case of ours.
There are however, two important behavioral differences between our model and standard
RDEU. First, because each probability weighting used in our model is concave, and because
the agent uses the worst one of them, then in our agent can never exhibit a behavior that
goes ‘against Allais:’ she is either certainty-biased, or she satisfies Expected Utility – she is
never ‘certainty-averse.’ By contrast, the RDEU model is more flexible, as it also allows for
certainty-aversion by allowing convex probability weighting.
On the other hand, however, once we focus on concave probability weightings, while in
RDEU the agent has a fixed distortion to be used for every lottery, in our representation
she could have multiple ones, and use a different one depending on the lottery at hand.
Importantly, we would argue that this additional flexibility could prove to be desirable from
a modeling prospective. Let us illustrate this with an example. Consider the following 2
lotteries: p = 1
3
$0 + 1
3
$1 + 1
3
$10, 000 ; q = 1
3
$0 + 1
3
$9, 999 + 1
3
$10, 000. In the RDEU
model the agent must use the same probability distortion for both lotteries p and q – the
rank of the three outcomes is the same, and since in RDEU only the relative rank matter,
the probability distortion is bound to be the same.21 So the agent is bound always to distort
the intermediate outcome in the same way – despite the fact that in p this intermediate
outcome is comparably ‘very bad’, while in q it is comparably ‘very good’. By contrast, our
model could accommodate the situation in which in p both the probabilities of $0 and of $1
are much overweighted and the probability of $10,000 is underweighted, while for q only the
probability of $0 is overweighted, while both that of $9,999 and of $10,000 are underweighted
– a behavior which, we would argue, is more in line with standard notions of pessimism.
A natural question is then to identify the conditions which guarantee that our set of
distortions Ψ is a singleton – the special case of our model which coincides with concave
RDEU on objective lotteries. It turns out that to characterize such special case all we need
is an axiom that guarantees that the preferences of our agent must be of the RDEU form
for objective lotteries. This means that we could simply impose the Probability trade-off
consistency Axiom of Abdellaoui (2002), or both the Comonotonic Sure-Thing Principle and
the Comonotonic Mixture Independence axioms of Chateauneuf (1999), as either of these
axioms, as proved in the respective papers, together with our monotonicity and continuity
imply that we could represent our preferences using a single RDEU functional (not necessarily
concave). Since from our representation we also know that we can represent as the min of
a set of concave functionals, then that we can represent using a unique concave RDEU
functional.22
21In fact, this is one of the fundamental and characterizing features of RDEU: see Diecidue and Wakker
(2001).
22In turns, this implies that our axioms together, and Hedging in particular, must imply both the Attraction
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2.6.3 Maps from lotteries into acts
One of the features of the Multiple Priors Multiple Distortions representation is that our
agent maps each objective lottery into an act on [0, 1] using a measure-preserving map. This
map could take many forms, and the representation guarantees the existence of a set of priors
which would work for any map, as long as it is measure-preserving. Alternatively, we could
have looked for a representation in which the agent uses fixed, specific map, and had a set
of priors which would work for this specific map only. Indeed, if a Multiple Priors Multiple
Distortions representation exists, so must this alternative representation – it simply posits a
weaker requirement. At the same time, however, once we focus on a specific map, we might
be able to derive additional properties on the set of priors Φ on [0, 1]. We will now argue
that this is indeed the case.
Let us focus a specific map γ¯ from ∆(X) into acts on [0, 1], the one that goes ‘from
worst to best.’ For any lottery p, enumerate the outcomes in its support from worst to
best, i.e. xi−1  xi for i = 2, . . . , |supp(p)|. Now define γ¯(p) as γ¯(p)
(
[0, p(x1)
)
= x1 and
γ(p)
(
[
∑i−1 ij=1p(xi),∑ij=1 p(xi))) = xi for i = 2, |supp(p)|. Intuitively, γ assigns the worst
outcomes to the smallest states in [0, 1], and the best outcomes to the higher ones. Then,
we have the following observation.
Observation 1. Suppose that  admits a MP-MD representation. Then, it must also admit
a representation which is identical to an MP-MD representation, but in which: 1) the agent
uses a fixed map γ¯ to map lotteries into priors in [0, 1]; 2) the set of priors on [0, 1] used in
this representation are all decreasing, i.e. theirs PDFs are all (weakly) decreasing functions.
Too see why, notice that if  admits a MP-MD representation, then it must also admit
a MP-MC-RDEU representation with set of distortions Ψ. For any ψ ∈ Ψ, consider its
derivative ψ′, and call D the set of all derivatives. Indeed each D is a decreasing function,
and by construction must integrate to 1 on [0, 1]. Now consider each member of D as a PDF,
and call Φ’ the corresponding set of priors on [0, 1]. It is easy to see that Φ’ is in fact the
desired set of priors.
Observation 1 shows that if we focus on a specific map, the one from ‘worst to best,’
then not only we could find a set of priors which work for that specific map, which is trivial,
but in particular every prior in this set must be ‘decreasing,’ i.e. assign a higher weight to
‘earlier’ states: in particular, it must overweight ‘early’ states, and underweight ‘late’ ones.
And since for this map early states are the ones to which the worst outcomes are assigned,
while the good ones are assigned to late, underweighted states, then we have a representation
in which each of the priors used by the agent, each of her distortions, must be ‘pessimistic.’
2.7 Hedging-Neutrality and Restricted Violations
As we mentioned in the discussion above, one of the features of our representations is that
they allow for the simultaneous violations of both standard Anscombe-Aumann Expected
Utility on acts, and of vNM Expected Utility on objective lotteries. We now turn to analyze
for Certainty Axiom of Chateauneuf (1999), as well as that our preferences on objective lotteries exhibits
Probabilistic Risk Aversion as defined in Abdellaoui (2002), since both are implied by the existence of a
concave RDEU representation.
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which would be the behavioral axioms that allow us to restrict violations to only one of these
domains. To do this, we can impose various forms of ‘hedging neutrality,’ i.e. posit that
the decision maker has no incentive to hedge. There are three ways in which we could do
this: by imposing that the decision maker never has an incentive to hedge; that she never
has such incentive between acts that map only to degenerate lotteries; that she never has it
between degenerate acts. The following axioms formalize this.
A.7 (Hedging Neutrality). For any f, g ∈ ∆(X), and for any h ∈ ⊕ 12p,q, if f ∼ g, then
h ∼ f .
A.8 (Hedging-Neutrality on Acts). For any f, g, h ∈ F such that f ∼ g, h ∈⊕12f,g and
such that for all ω ∈ Ω we have f(ω) = δx and g(ω) = δy for some x, y ∈ X, we have h ∼ f .
A.9 (Hedging-Neutrality on Lotteries). For any p, q, r ∈ ∆(X) such that p ∼ q and
r ∈⊕12p,q, we have r ∼ p.
The consequences of these axioms, in addition to our previous ones, appear in the fol-
lowing proposition. (The proof follows standard arguments and it is therefore omitted.)
Proposition 1. Consider a preference relation  that admits a MP-MD representation
(u,Π,Φ). Then the following holds:
(a) |Π| = 1 if, and only if,  satisfies Axiom 8 (Hedging Neutrality on Acts);
(b) |Φ| = 1 and Φ = {`} if, and only if,  satisfies Axiom 9 (Hedging Neutrality on
Lotteries), which, in turns, holds if and only if  satisfies Risk Independence.
(c) |Π| = |Φ| = 1, and Φ = {`} if and only if  satisfies Axiom 7 (Hedging Neutrality).
2.8 A comparative notion of attraction towards certainty
We now introduce a comparative notion of attraction towards certainty. We take an ap-
proach which follows the notions of comparative ambiguity aversion in Epstein (1999) and
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), extend it to our more general setup, and show that the
same intuition of attraction towards certainty implies both more ambiguity aversion and
more probability distortions.
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) present the following notion. Consider two decision
maker, 1 and 2, such that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1 is: that is, whenever 1
prefers a certain option δx to some act f , so does decision maker 2. Such attraction could be
interpreted in two ways. First, both agents treat both probabilities and events in the same
way, but 2 has a utility function which is more concave than that of 1. Alternatively, the
curvature of the utility function could be the same for both agents, but 2 could be ‘more
pessimistic’ than 1 is. The approach of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) focuses on this
second case – look at the relative attraction towards certainty while keeping constant the
curvature of the utility function. It turns out that in our setup imposing that the utility
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function has the same curvature translates in a very simple requirement: we want ⊕1 = ⊕2,
that is, both agents should have the same approach to outcome mixtures – which, as our
derivation of ⊕ argues, implies that they have the same curvature of the utility function.
With this in mind, we can then use the following definition introduced by (Ghirardato and
Marinacci, 2002, Definition 7):23
Definition 7. Let 1 and 2 be two complete and non-degenerate preference relations on
F . We say that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 2 if the following hold:
1. ⊕1 = ⊕2
2. for all x ∈ X and all f ∈ F
δx 1 f ⇒ δx 2 f
and
δx 1 f ⇒ δx 2 f.
It turns out that this definition, which was developed for a standard setup in which
agent’s preferences are vNM on objective lotteries, works in out setup as well.
Proposition 2. Let 1 and 2 be two complete and non-degenerate preference relations
on F that admit Multiple Priors and Multiple Distortions Representations (u1,Π1,Φ1) and
(u2,Π2,Φ2). Then, the following are equivalent:
1. 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1 and ⊕1 = ⊕2;
2. u1 is a positive affine transformation of u2, Π2 ⊇ Π1 and Φ2 ⊇ Φ1.
That is, if we consider two agents who have the same outcome-mixtures, derived from ⊕,
and such that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1, then both set of priors Π and Φ of 1
are smaller than those of 2.
3 Overview of the related literature
A large literature has been devoted to developing models that allow for Allais or Ellsberg-type
behavior. To the best of our knowledge, however, almost no models in the literature allow
for both features at the same time in standard setups such as that of Anscombe and Aumann
(1963). On the one hand, most models meant to study Allais-like behavior do not consider
the presence of subjective probabilities at all, thus ruling out Ellsberg-type behavior. On
23There are two minor differences between what follows and (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002, Definition 7).
First, here we require ⊕1 = ⊕2 , instead of requiring that the two preferences are cardinally symmetric,
as defined in (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002, Definition 5). However, it is not hard to see that these
two conditions are equivalent, since both imply that the (unique) utility indexes must be positive affine
transformations of each other. The second difference is in the name: they interpret this comparative ranking
as higher ambiguity aversion, while we interpret it more simply as attraction towards certainty. The reason
is, calling this a comparative ambiguity aversion would not be precise here: our agents could be identically
ambiguity averse, but have a higher tendency to ‘distort probabilities’ which lead them to a higher attraction
towards certainty.
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the other hand, models meant to capture ambiguity aversion either do not consider objective
lotteries at all, operating in the setup of Savage; or do consider them, operating in the setup
of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), but also assume that agents satisfy vNM independence on
objective lotteries, thus ruling out the possibility of Allais-like behavior.24 The relevant axiom
for this assumption, which posits that the agent satisfies vNM independence on constant acts,
is usually called Risk Independence, and it is implied by essentially all the weakening of
independence suggested in the literature for this setup.25 (See Gilboa and Marinacci (2011)
for a survey.) From the point of view of the literature on Ambiguity Aversion, therefore,
one can see our paper as taking the standard setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), and
obtaining a representation that coincides with MaxMin Expected Utility on acts which do
not involve objective lotteries, while at the same time weakening the assumption of Risk
Independence, and allowing for Allais-type behavior for objective lotteries. Indeed ours is
not the first paper to relax risk independence in this setup. First of all, Ghirardato et al.
(2001, 2003) show that one can obtain exactly an MaxMin Expected Utility representation
by considering outcome mixtures, while at the same time disregarding objective lotteries –
thus not restricting, but also not modeling, how the agent reacts to them. On the other hand,
Drapeau and Kupper (2010) considers a model which corresponds to one in which agents
exhibit uncertainty averse preferences a’ la Cerreia et al. (2010) on acts that do not involve
objective lotteries, while modeling her reaction to objective risk in a way similar to the model
of Cerreia-Vioglio (2010).26 As we shall see in our discussion of the latter, however, while
the latter allows violations of vNM independence, these are not necessarily in the direction
suggested by the Allais paradox. By contrast, in our model agents always violate vNM
independence for objective lotteries in the direction suggested by Allais paradox.
From a procedural point of view, our paper considers the notion of outcome-mixtures,
which we denote by the symbol ⊕, instead of probability mixtures. Procedures of this kind
are indeed not new: we refer to Ghirardato et al. (2001, 2003), Wakker (1994), Kobberling
and Wakker (2003), and to the many references therein. More precisely, one could see our
approach as the translation of the one of Ghirardato et al. (2003) to the case of objective
probabilities. We then use this approach to introduce the novel notion of outcome mixture
of lotteries, a central step in our analysis.
Our model is naturally related also to the models that study violations of Expected Util-
ity in the case of risk (and not ambiguity). First of all, our work is conceptually very closely
related to that of Maccheroni (2002) and Cerreia-Vioglio (2010): both papers provide repre-
sentation in which the decision maker treats objective lotteries as ‘ambiguous objects,’ as we
do, and find representation reminiscent of the ones developed to study ambiguity aversion.
24In addition, a few papers consider objective lotteries together with subjective uncertainty while using
Savage acts: for example, Klibanoff et al. (2005). These papers as well add the additional assumption that
the agent satisfies vNM Expected Utility on lotteries.
25This is true for the models in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Maccheroni et al. (2006), since both
Centainty Independence and Weak-Certainty Independence imply the much weaker Risk Independence. And
it is also true in the much more general models of Cerreia et al. (2010), Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011), and
Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2010).
26More precisely, since Drapeau and Kupper (2010) studies a preorder which corresponds to the risk
perception instead of standard preferences, as standard in their literature, their results are formally equivalent
but ‘inverted:’ instead of positing quasi-concavity, they posit quasi-convexity, and instead of obtaining the
inf over a set of measures, they obtain the sup.
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Neither, however, studies Ellsberg-like behavior – they both work in the setup of vNM. Even
focusing in the case of risk, moreover, both models have a fundamental difference with ours:
while in our representation the decision maker has a fixed utility function, but has multiple
probability distortions to evaluate lotteries, in both the papers above the opposite holds: the
agent uses the correct probabilities, which are fixed, but at the same time she acts as if she
had ambiguity over her utility. In particular, Maccheroni (2002) assumes that preferences
are continuous, satisfy a weakening of vNM independence, as well as traditional convexity,27
and obtains a representation such that the agent has a set of utility functions, and evaluates
each lottery according to the worst of these utilities for that lotteries – a representation
which is much the counterpart of ours, with multiple utilities instead of multiple probability
distortions. Then, Cerreia-Vioglio (2010) generalizes this model by dropping independence
entirely, and only requiring a weaker form of convexity, quasi-convexity.28 He then derives a
representation which generalizes that in Maccheroni (2002) in a similar way in which Cerreia
et al. (2010) generalizes the one in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). This conceptual difference
in the representation entails an important difference in behavior: while our model is designed
to address the Allais paradox, and, more in general, attraction towards certainty, the ones
in Maccheroni (2002) and Cerreia-Vioglio (2010) have a different goal, and agents in both of
their models may exhibit certainty aversion – the opposite of Allais. This is particularly easy
to see in the model of Maccheroni (2002): since there are multiple utilities and the agent
is considering the worst one of them, then she would rather not face a certain outcome,
where the worst utility can be chosen by the malevolent nature, but rather face a lottery,
where nature needs to choose the worst utility for all elements in the support, and therefore
cannot make the agent ‘too worse off.’29 From this point of view, therefore, one can see
Maccheroni (2002) and Cerreia-Vioglio (2010) as exploring the consequences of convexity or
quasi-convexity, while we aim to study a notion of pessimism.
We have already discussed (Section 2.6.2) how our model is much related to the RDEU
model of Quiggin (1982): while the restriction of our model to objective lotteries (i.e. when
|Ω| = 1) is not nested with the general formulation of RDEU, it is a strict generalization of
RDEU with concave probability distortions. Our results are also related to those of Dillen-
berger (2010). Dillenberger (2010) studies two properties: Negative Certainty Independence
(NCI), and PORU, which is preference for one-shot resolution of uncertainty. He shows that
they are equivalent under some basic assumptions. Moreover, he also shows that NCI is not
satisfied by RDEU unless it is Expected Utility. On the one hand, it is easy to construct
examples of our model which might violate NCI. On the other hand, whether the only model
in our class of preferences that satisfies NCI is Expected Utility is still an open question.
A second strand of literature aims to capture Allais-type behavior by weakening the
requirement of independence to that of betweenness30: see, among others, Chew (1983),
27A preference relation  on a convex set is convex if for all p, q, r, if p  r and q  r, then αp+(1−α)q  r.
28More precisely, he only requires that, for any to lotteries p, q such that p ∼ q we have αp+ (1−α)q  p
for all α ∈ (0, 1).
29Consider, for example, an agent whose preferences are represented a’ la Maccheroni (2002) with the
following utilities: u1(x) = 0, u1(y) = 1, u2(x) = 1, u2(y) = 0. Indeed this agent would rank x ∼ y, but she
would also rank 12x+
1
2y  x, in violation of attraction towards certainty.
30A preference relation satisfied betweenness if, for any p, q ∈ ∆(X), p ∼ q implies αp+ (1− α)q ∼ p for
all α ∈ [0, 1].
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Dekel (1986), and the disappointment aversion model of Gul (1991). It is well known that
this class of model is distinct from the RDEU class. Similarly, it is also easy to construct an
example of our model which violates the betweenness axiom.
Although there are few models that allows for both the Allais and the Ellsberg paradox
to be present at the same time in the standard setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), the
idea of a connection between these behaviors is not new. Previous authors have noted that
the RDEU representation is formally identical to the Choquet Expected Utility model of
Schmeidler (1989), one of the most well-known models used to study ambiguity aversion. In
particular, in a setup in with a fixed state space, a given set of outcomes, and an objective
probability distribution over these states, the axioms of Schmeidler (1989) together with
a form of First Order Stochastic Dominance, leads exactly to RDEU for acts defined on
this space. (See, among others, Wakker (1990), Chew and Wakker (1996), Wakker (1996),
Chateauneuf (1999), and Diecidue and Wakker (2001) for an in-depth analysis.). The key
component is the use of Schmeidler (1989)’s axiom of Comonotonic Independence, which
posits that if we focus only on acts which ‘move together’ in the sense of agreeing which are
the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states, then independence should be satisfied. In a similar spirit, we use
a generalized version of Schmeidler (1989)’s hedging axiom to obtain a representation which
is similar to the MaxMin Expected Utility model for the case of risk: it is not hard to see
that, at least in a rather loose sense, our model of decision making under risk compares to
RDEU in a similar way to which the Choquet Expected Utility compares to the MaxMin
Expected Utility model – hence the differences between RDEU and our model discussed
above. There are, however, some conceptual differences between our approach and the one
followed by the literature. The first, most important difference is that these papers identify
a connection between the functional forms of RDEU and Choquet EU, without discussing
common restriction about their approach to risk or ambiguity; people could be ‘pessimistic’ or
‘optimistic’ in both domains, or indeed pessimistic on one domain and optimistic in another.
By contrast, one of the goals of our paper is to identify a unique axiom which implies a
forms of pessimism in both aspects. Put differently, while we argue that Hedging implies
both Allais and Ellsberg-like behavior, this literature shows that comonotonic independence
implies a similar representation in both dimensions, although without restrictions as to
whether either Allais or Ellsberg-like behavior would emerge. And indeed one cannot impose
Schmeidler (1989)’s hedging axiom to both environments to derive pessimism, because, as
we’ve discussed, such axiom would not imply pessimism for risk.31 By contrast, one could
do this precisely using the axiom that we introduce, which generalizes Schmeidler (1989)’s
intuition to capture pessimism on objective risk as well. A secondary difference is that we
derive a model with the simultaneous presence of Ellsberg and Allais-like behavior, instead
of focusing on a specific one of these. This possible because our approach applies to the
standard setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), where both features could be present at
the same time. By contrast, the approach followed by most of these papers would not apply in
such setup, and, in general would not apply to the case in which lotteries are elements of the
simplex, as in von-Neumann Morgenstern or as in the questions of the Allais experiment.32
31We should emphasize, moreover, that this axiom could in general not even be defined in the environment
in which most of this literature operates, as it does not allow the notion of mixture required to define the
axiom.
32Most of this literature studies a setup in which we have a given set of states of world with an objective
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Segal (1987) and Segal (1990) suggest a different channel to connect the Allais and
Ellsberg paradox: he argues that both could be seen as stemming from a failure of reduction
of compound lotteries. In particular, Segal (1990) shows how RDEU can be derived precisely
from such postulate, while in Segal (1987) argues how the Ellsberg paradox could be seen in
a similar light: he argues that “the ambiguous lottery (x, S; 0, S) (ambiguous in the sense
that the decision maker does not know the probability of S) should be considered a two-stage
lottery, where the first, imaginary, stage is over the possible values of the probability of S”
(Segal, 1987, pg. 177). As opposed to our analysis, however, his approach is based on a
setup much richer than the standard one of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) – to be able to
discuss reduction of compound lotteries, two-stage lotteries need to be observable.
Finally, our work is also related to the recent Gumen et al. (2011), which is also built
on the intuition of subjective evaluations of objective lotteries. They introduce a framework
where they can analyze subjective distortions of objective probabilities: they study the
preferences of a decision maker on space of pairs composed of 1) a probability measure
over a state space and of 2) an Anscombe-Aumann act (over the same state space) – an
object that they call a ’info-act.’ The idea is that an info-act captures either a situation
of objective uncertainty, or that of subjective risk. Using this framework, they are then
able to define a behavioral notion of ‘pessimism’ for risky prospects in a way reminiscent
of uncertainty aversion. After defining the natural mappings between these preferences and
the more standard preferences over lotteries, they then show how their behavioral notion
of pessimism in the info-act world implies that the corresponding preference over lotteries
exhibits a form of pessimism consistent with the Allais paradox — for example, if they
admitted a RDEU representation, it would have a concave probability weighting. Their
paper has therefore a different focus from ours: while we derive a characterization theorem
in the standard setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), they introduce a novel space that
allows them to define a more general notion of pessimism, but do not look for a representation
theorem.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a novel link between two of the most discussed paradoxes
in decision theory: those of Ellsberg and Allais. We have demonstrated that a preference
for hedging, properly defined, can lead to both behaviors. we derive a representation which
generalizes the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) multiple priors model in such a way that
objective probabilities are treated like subjective objects, with ‘multiple priors’ of their own.
The resulting model of choice under risk is a strict generalization of the RDEU model with
concave distortions.
While our model does not require an agent who exhibits Allais-type behavior to also
exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior, or vice versa, intuitively our result on the existence of a
similar channel to capture both tendencies would seem to make this more likely to be the case.
In this light, we highlight a recent experimental result in Dean and Ortoleva (2011), which
tests the existence of an empirical relation between these behaviors. Preliminary results
suggest not only the significant presence of each individual bias, but also the presence of a
probability distributions – a setup where it is much easier to posit comonotonic independence.
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significant, although small, positive relationship between the two. We interpret this as further
evidence of the fact that not only these two phenomena exists and could be economically
relevant, at least as much as could be suggested by an experiment on undergraduate students,
but also that they are related to each other.
A Appendix A: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of (1) ⇒ (2).
The proof will proceed with the following 6 steps: 1) we construct a derived preference
relation on the Savage space with consequences X and set of states Ω×[0, 1]; 2) We prove that
the continuity properties of the original preference relation imply some continuity property of
the derived preference relation. 3) we prove that this derived relation is locally bi-separable
(in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001)) for some event in the space Ω× [0, 1]; 4)
we prove that this derived relation admits a representation remininscent MaxMin Expected
Utility in the larger Savage space; 5) we use this result to provide a representation for the
restriction of  to constant acts; 6) we merge the two representations to obtain the desired
representation for the acts in F ′.
Step 1. Denote by Σ∗ the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1], and consider a state space Ω′ :=
Ω × [0, 1] with the appropriate sigma-algebra Σ′ := Σ × Σ∗. Define F ′ the set of simple
Savage acts on Ω′, i.e. Σ′-measurable, finite valued functions f ′ : Ω′ → X. To avoid
confusion, we use f ′, g′, . . . to denote generic elements of this space.33 Define ⊕ on F ′ like
we did in F : once we have ⊕ defined on X, for any f ′, g′ ∈ F ′ and α ∈ (0, 1), αf ′⊕ (1−α)g′
is the act in F ′ such that (αf ′ ⊕ (1 − α)g′)(ω′) = αf ′(ω′) ⊕ (1 − α)g′(ω′) for all ω′ ∈ Ω′.
(Moreover, since each act in F ′ is a function from Ω × [0, 1] into X, for all f ′ ∈ F ′ and for
all ω ∈ Ω abusing notation we can denote f ′(ω, ·) : [0, 1]→ X as the act that is constant in
the first componente (Ω) but not on the second component ([0, 1]).)
We now define two maps, one from F to F ′, and the other from F ′ to F . Define first of
all γ−1 : F ′ → F as
γ−1(f ′)(ω)(x) = `(f ′(ω, ·)−1(x))
where `(·) denotes the Lebesgue measure. It is easy to see that γ−1(f) is well defined. Now
define γ : F → 2F ′ as
γ(f) = {f ′ ∈ F ′ : f = γ−1(f ′)}.
Notice that, by construction, we must have γ(f)∩ γ(g) = ∅ for all f, g ∈ F such that f 6= g.
(Otherwise, we would have some f ′ ∈ F ′ such that γ−1(f ′) = f and γ−1(f ′) = g, which is
not possible since f 6= g.) Moreover, notice that we must have that γ(δx) = {x}. Finally,
notice that γF := ∪f∈Fγ(f) = F ′ by construction.
Define now ′ on F ′ as follows: f ′ ′ g′ if, and only if, f  g for some f, g ∈ F such
that f = γ−1(f ′) and g = γ−1(g′). Define by ∼′ and ′ is symmetric and asymmetric parts.
(Notice that this implies f ′ ∼′ g′ if f ′, g′ ∈ γ(f) for some f ∈ F .)
33Following the same abuses of notation of the main setup, for any x ∈ X we also refer to the constant
act x ∈ F ′ which returns x in every state.
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We will now claim that ′ is a complete preference relation on F ′.
Claim 1. ∗ is a complete preference relation.
Proof. The completeness of ′ is a trivial consequence of the completeness of  and the fact
that γ(F) = F ′. Similarly, the reflexivity follows from the reflexivity of ′. To prove that ′
is transitive, consider some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ′ g′ and g′ ′ h′. By construction, we
must have some f, g, h ∈ F such that f = γ−1(f ′), g = γ−1(g′), and h = γ−1(h′) such that
f  g and g  h. By transitivity of , we also have f  h, hence f ′ ′ h′ as sought.
Step 2. We now prove that the continuity properties of  are inherited by ∗. For any
sequence (f ′n) ∈ (F ′∞, and any f ′ ∈ F ′, we say that f ′n → f ′ pointwise if fn(ω)→ f (in the
relevant topology) for all ω ∈ Ω′.
Claim 2. For any (fn) ∈ (F)∞, f ∈ F , if there exists (f ′n) ∈ (F ′∞, f ′ ∈ F ′ such that
fn = γ
−1(f ′n) for all n, f = γ
−1(f ′), and such that f ′n → f ′ pointwise, then we must have
that fn → f .
Proof. We will prove the claim for the case in which fn and f are constant acts, i.e. fn, f ∈
∆(X). The extension to the general case follows trivially. Assume that f ′n and f
′ as above
exist: we will now prove that if pn = γ
−1(f ′n) for all n, and if p = γ
−1(f), then pn → p
(weakly). Consider now some continuous v, and notice that we must have that
∫
X
v(u)dpn =∫
[0,1]
v(f ′n)d` by contruction of γ. (Recall that ` is the Lebesgue measure.) Moreover, since v
is continuous and since f ′n pointwise converges to f
′, we must then have that
∫
[0,1]
v(f ′n)d`→∫
[0,1]
v(f ′)d` =
∫
X
v(u)dp: in turns, this means
∫
X
v(u)dpn =
∫
X
v(u)dp. Since this was
proved for a generic continuous v, we must have pn → p (in weak convergence).
Step 3. We now prove that ′ is locally biseparable for some event A ∈ Σ′. Consider the
event A = Ω × [0, 1
2
]. Define ΣA as the algebra generated by A, i.e. ΣA := {∅, A,AC ,Ω′},
and by F ′A the corresponding set of acts, which is a subset of F ′. We will now prove that
the restriction of ′ on acts measurable under A is biseparable in the sense of Ghirardato
and Marinacci (2001). We procced by a sequence of Claims.
Claim 3. There exist x, y ∈ X such that δx  δy.
Proof. Suppose, by means of contradiction, that δx ∼ δy for all x, y ∈ X. Then, we would
have that p DFOSD q for all p, q ∈ ∆(X). By Axiom 1 (FOSD), therefore, we would have
p ∼ q for all p, q ∈ ∆(X). In turns, by Axiom 2 (Monotonicity) we must have f ∼ g for all
f, g ∈ F , but this contradicts the assumption that  is non-degenerate.
Claim 4 (Dominance). For every f ′, g′ ∈ F ′, if f ′(ω′) ′ g′(ω′) for every ω′ ∈ Ω′, then
f ′  g′.
Proof. Consider some f ′, g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′(ω′) ′ g′(ω′) for every ω′ ∈ Ω′. Now consider
f ′(ω, ·) and g′(ω, ·) for some ω ∈ Ω, and notice that we have that both γ−1(f ′(ω, ·)) and
γ−1(g′(ω, ·)) are constant acts (in F). Since we have f ′(ω,A) ′ g′(ω,A) for all A ∈ Σ∗,
and since x ′ y if and only if δx  δy, then we must also have that γ−1(f ′(ω, ·)) DFOSD
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γ−1(g′(ω, ·)) by construction. By Axiom 1 (FOSD), then, we must have γ−1(f ′(ω, ·)) 
γ−1(g′(ω, ·)) for all ω ∈ Ω. In turns, this means that, for the acts fˆ , gˆ ∈ F defined by
fˆ(ω) := γ−1(f ′(ω, ·)) and gˆ(ω) := γ−1(g′(ω, ·)) for all ω ∈ Ω, we have fˆ  gˆ by Axiom
2 (Monotonicity). But then, notice that we must have that f ′ ∈ γ(fˆ) and g′ ∈ γ(gˆ) by
construction. But this means that we have f ′ ′ g′ as sought.
Claim 5. For any x, y ∈ X, γ−1(xAy) = 1
2
x+ 1
2
y.
Proof. Notice first of all that, since xAy ∈ F ′ is a constant act, then so much be γ−1(xAy).
Moreover, notice that by definition of γ−1 we must have that for all ω ∈ Ω, γ−1(xAy)(ω)(x) =
1
2
; similarly, for all ω ∈ Ω γ−1(xAy)(ω)(y) = 1
2
. This implies that we have γ−1(xAy(ω)(x) =
1
2
x+ 1
2
y as sought.
Claim 6. For every x, y ∈ X, there exists z ∈ X such that z ∼′ xAy.
Proof. Consider x, y ∈ X, and notice that γ−1(xAy) = 1
2
x+ 1
2
y by claim 5. Now notice that,
by Axiom 3 (Continuity) and 1 (FOSD), there must exist z ∈ X such that 1
2
x+ 1
2
y ∼ δz. We
have previously observed that γ−1(z) = δz, which implies γ−1(z) ∼ γ−1(xAy), which implies
xAy ∼′ z as sought.
Given Claim 6, for any x, y ∈ X, define ce′(xAy) := z for some z ∈ X such that xAy ∼′ z.
Claim 7 (Essentiality). A is an essential event for ′.34
Proof. Consider any x, y ∈ X such that δx  δy – Claim 3 guarantee that they exist. Now
consider the p = 1
2
x + 1
2
y. By Axiom 1 (FOSD) we must have δx  p  δy. Now consider
the act xAy ∈ F ′. Notice that we have xAy(ω × [0, 5]) = x and xAy(ω × [0.5, 1]) = δy for
all ω ∈ Ω. By construction, therefore, we must have xAy ∈ γ(p), x ∈ γ(δx) and y ∈ γ(δy).
By definition of ′, then, we have x ′ xAy ′ y as sought.
Claim 8 (A-Monotonicity). For any non-null event B ∈ ΣA, and x, y, z ∈ X such that
x, y  z we have
x ′ y ⇐ xBz ′ yBz.
Moreover, for any non-universal35 B ∈ ΣA, x, y, z ∈ X s.t. x, y  z
x ′ y ⇐ zBx ′ zBy
Proof. Consider an event B ∈ ΣA, and x, y, z ∈ X such that x ′ y. Notice that by
construction this implies δx  δy. Notice also that the non-null events in ΣA are A,AC ,
and Ω′. In the case of B = Ω′ we have xBz = x and yBz = y, which guarantees that
x ′ y. Now consider the case in which B = A. By Claim 5, γ−1(xAz) = 1
2
x + 1
2
z, and
γ−1(yAz) = 1
2
y + 1
2
z. Since δx  δy, then 12x + 12z BFOSD 12y + 12z, which, by Axiom 1
(FOSD), implies 1
2
x + 1
2
z  1
2
y + 1
2
z, hence γ−1(xAz)  γ−1(yAz). By construction of ′
this implies xAz ′ yAz. Now consider the case in which B = Ac. This implies that we
have xACz = zAx and yACz = zAy. Notice, however, that by construction we must have
34We recall that an event E is essential if we have x ′ xAy ′ y for some x, y ∈ X.
35An event is universal if y ∼ xAy for all x, y ∈ X such that x  y.
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zAx ∈ γ(1
2
x + 1
2
z). Since we also have xAz ∈ γ(1
2
x + 1
2
z), by construction of ′ we must
have zAx ∼′ xAz. Similarly, we have zAy ∼′ yAz. We have already proved that we must
have xAz  yAz, and this, by transitivity, implies zAA ′ zAy as sought.
Now consider some B ∈ ΣA which is non-universal. If B = ∅, we trivially have that
x ′ y ⇐ zBx ′ zBy. Now consider the case in which B = A. In this case we have x ′ y
and we need to show zAx ′ zAy: but this is exactly what we have showed above. Similarly,
when B = AC , we need to show that if x ′ y then xAz ′ yAx – which is again exactly
what we have shown before.
Claim 9 (A-Continuity). Let {g′α}α∈D ⊆ F ′A be a net that pointwise converges to g′. For
every f ′ ∈ F ′, if g′α ′ f (resp. f ′ g′α) for all α ∈ D, then g′ ′ f ′ (resp. f ′ ′ g′).
Proof. This claim is a trivial consequence of the continuity of  and of Claim 2. To see
why, consider f ′, g′ ∈ F ′ and a net {g′α}α∈D ⊆ F ′A that pointwise converges to g′ such that
g′α ′ f ′ for all α ∈ D. By contruction we must have γ−1(g′α)  γ−1(f ′). Now, notice that,
if g′α pointwise converges to some g
′, then we must have that γ−1(g′α) converges to γ
−1(g′)
by Claim 2. But then, by continuity of  (Axiom 3), we must have γ−1(g′)  γ−1(f ′), and
therefore g′ ′ f ′ as sought. The proof of the opposite case (f ′ g′α for all α ∈ D) is
analogous.
Claim 10 (A-Substitution). For any x, y, z′, z′′ ∈ X and B,C ∈ ΣA such that x ′ z′ ′ y
and x ′ z′′ ′ y, we have
ce′xBz′Cce
′
z′′By ∼′ ce′xCz′′Bce′z′Cy.
Proof. Consider first the case in which B = ∅. In this case, the claim becomes ce′z′Cce′y ∼′
ce′z′Cy, which is trivially true. The case C = ∅ is analogous. Now consider the case B = Ω′.
The claim becomes ce′xCce
′
z′′ ∼′ ce′xCz′′ which again is trivially true. The case in which
C = Ω′ is again analogous.
We are left with the case in which B = A and C = AC . (The case B = AC and C = A
is again analogous.) In this case the claim becomes ce′xAz′A
Cce′z′′Ay ∼′ ce′xACz′′Ace′z′Cy, which
is equivalent to ce′z′′AyAce
′
xAz′ ∼′ ce′z′′AxAce′yAz′ . Now notice that since ce′xAy ∈ X for all
x, y ∈ X, by claim 5, we have that γ−1(ce′z′′AyAce′xAz′) = 12ce′z′′Ay+ 12ce′xAz′ . At the same time,
consider some r, s ∈ X, and notice that, since ce′rAs ∼′ rAs by contruction, then we must
have γ−1(ce′rAs) ∼ γ−1(rAs). Since γ−1(rAs) = 12r+ 12s again by claim 5, then we have that
γ−1(ce′rAs) ∼ 12r + 12s. Moreover, since ce′rAs ∈ X, then we must have that δce′rAs ∼ δce1
2
z+
1
2
s
.
Since this is true for all r, s ∈ X, then by Axiom 1 (FOSD) we must have 1
2
ce1
2
z′′+ 1
2
y
+
1
2
ce1
2
x+
1
2
z′
∼ 1
2
ce′z′′Ay +
1
2
ce′xAz′ , hence γ
−1(ce′z′′AyAce
′
xAz′) ∼ 12ce1
2
z′′+ 1
2
y
+ 1
2
ce1
2
x+
1
2
z′
. By anal-
ogous arguments, we must have γ−1(ce′z′′AxAce
′
yAz′) ∼ 12ce1
2
z′′+ 1
2
x
+ 1
2
ce1
2
y+
1
2
z′
. At the same
time, Axiom 4 we must have ce1
2
z′′+ 1
2
y
+ 1
2
ce1
2
x+
1
2
z′
∼ 1
2
ce1
2
z′′+ 1
2
x
+ 1
2
ce1
2
y+
1
2
z′
, which by transi-
tivity implies γ−1(ce′z′′AyAce
′
xAz′) ∼ γ−1(ce′z′′AxAce′yAz′), hence ce′z′′AyAce′xAz′ ∼ ce′z′′AxAce′yAz′
as sought.
Notice that these claims above prove that ′ is locally-biseparable in the sense of Ghi-
rardato and Marinacci (2001).
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Step 4. We now prove that ′ admits a representation similar to MMEU. We proceed
again by claims.
Claim 11 (C-Independence). For any f ′, g′ ∈ F ′, x ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1)
f ′ ∼′ g′ ⇒ αf ′ ⊕ (1− α)x ∼′ αg′ ⊕ (1− α)x.
Proof. Consider f ′, g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ∼′ g′. Notice that we could have f ′ ∼′ g′ in two
possible cases: 1) γ−1(f ′) = γ−1(g′); 2) γ−1(f ′) 6= γ−1(g′) but γ−1(f ′) ∼ γ−1(g′). In either
case, we must have γ−1(f ′) ∼ γ−1(g′). By Axiom 5, then, we must have that for any
x ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1), αγ−1(f ′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx ∼ αγ−1(g′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx. Let us now consider
αγ−1(f ′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx, and notice that, by construction, we must have that f ′ ⊕ (1 − α)x ∈
γ(αγ−1(f ′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx): in fact, we must have that for every ω ∈ Ω and every y ∈ X,
(αγ−1(f ′)⊕(1−α)δx)(ω)(αy⊕(1−α)x) = `(f ′(ω)−1(αy⊕(1−α)x). In turns, this means that
γ−1(f ′⊕ (1−α)x) = αγ−1(f ′)⊕ (1−α)δx. Similarly, g′⊕ (1−α)x ∈ γ(αγ−1(g′)⊕ (1−α)δx)
and γ−1(g′ ⊕ (1 − α)x) = αγ−1(g′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx. Since we have αγ−1(f ′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx ∼
αγ−1(g′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx, then by transitivity γ−1(f ′ ⊕ (1 − α)x) ∼ γ−1(g′ ⊕ (1 − α)x), hence
f ′ ⊕ (1− α)x ∼′ g′ ⊕ (1− α)x as sought.
Claim 12 (Hedging). For any f ′, g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ∼′ g′
1
2
f ′ ⊕ 1
2
g′ ′ f ′.
Proof. Consider f ′, g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ∼′ g′. Notice that we could have f ′ ∼′ g′ in two
possible cases: 1) γ−1(f ′) = γ−1(g′); 2) γ−1(f ′) 6= γ−1(g′) but γ−1(f ′) ∼ γ−1(g′). In either
case, we must have γ−1(f ′) ∼ γ−1(g′). Now consider the act 1
2
f ′ ⊕ 1
2
g′: we will now prove
that, for all ω ∈ Ω, γ−1(1
2
f ′(ω, ·) ⊕ 1
2
g′(ω, ·)) ∈ ⊕12γ−1(f ′(ω,·)),γ−1(g′(ω,·)). To see why, notice
that for all ω ∈ Ω, (1
2
f ′(ω, ·)⊕ 1
2
g′(ω, ·))(A) = 1
2
f ′(ω,A)⊕ 1
2
g′(ω,A) for all A ∈ Σ∗: that is,
for every event in [0, 1] is assigns an x ∈ X which is the ⊕-1
2
-mixtures of what is assigned
by f ′(ω, ·) and g′(ω, ·). But this means that γ−1(1
2
f ′(ω, ·) ⊕ 1
2
g′(ω, ·)) must be a constant
act (lottery in ∆(X)) such that, if Hf
′,g′
x := {A ∈ Σ∗ : x = 12f ′(ω,A)] ⊕ 12g′(ω,A)}, then
γ−1(1
2
f ′(ω, ·) ⊕ 1
2
g′(ω, ·))(x) = `( ∪
A∈Hf ′,g′x
A). But then, we must have that γ−1(1
2
f ′(ω, ·) ⊕
1
2
g′(ω, ·)) ∈⊕12γ−1(f ′(ω,·)),γ−1(g′(ω,·)). By construction of ⊕ in the space F ′, then, we must have
that γ−1(1
2
f ′ ⊕ 1
2
g
′1
2
γ−1(f ′),γ−1(g′). But then, since we have already enstablished that we have
γ−1(f ′) ∼ γ−1(g′), by Axiom 6 (Hedging) we must have that γ−1(1
2
f ′⊕ 1
2
g′)  γ−1(f ′), which
implies 1
2
f ′ ⊕ 1
2
g′ ′ f ′ as sought.
Claim 13. There exists a continuous non-constant function u : X → R and a non-empty,
weak∗ compact and convex set P of finitely additive probabilities of Σ′ such that ′ is
represented by the functional
V ′(f ′) := min
p∈P
∫
Ω′
u(f ′)dp.
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation and P is unique. Moreover,
|P | = 1 if and only if ′ is such that for any f ′, g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ∼′ g′ we have
1
2
f ′ ⊕ 1
2
g′ ∼′ f ′.
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Proof. This Claim follows directly from Theorem 5 in (Ghirardato et al., 2001, page 12),
where the essential event for which axioms are defined is the event A defined above. (It should
be noted that weak∗-compactness of P follows as well.) The last part of the Theorem, which
characterizes the case in which |P | = 1, is a well-known property of MMEU representations.
(See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).)
Step 5. We now use the result above to provide a representation of the restriction of 
to constant acts. To this end, let us first look at the restriction of ′ to acts in F ′ that are
constant in their first component: define F∗ ⊂ F ′ as F∗ := {f ′ ∈ F ′ : f ′(ω, ·) = f ′(ω′, ·) for
all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω}. Define by ∗ the restriction of ′ to F∗.
Claim 14. There exists a unique nonempty, closed and convex set Φ of finitely additive
probabilities over Σ∗ sucht that ∗ is represented by
Vˆ ∗(f ∗) := min
p∈Φ
∫
[0,1]
u(f ∗(s)) dp
Proof. This result follows trivially from Claim 13 once we define Φ as projection of P on
[0, 1].
Claim 15. There exists a unique nonempty, closed and convex set Φ of finitely additive
probabilities over Σ∗ such that, for any enumeration of the support of {x1, . . . , x|supp(p)|}, the
restriction of  to ∆(X) is represented by the functional
V ∗(p) := min
φ∈Φ
|supp(p)|∑
i=1
φ([
i−1∑
j=1
p(xj),
i∑
j=1
p(xj)])u(xi)
Proof. Construct the set Φ of closed and convex finitely additive probabilities over Σ∗ fol-
lowing Claim 14, and define Vˆ ∗ accordingly. Notice first of all that, by construction of γ
and by definition of F∗, we must have that γ(p) ⊆ F∗ for all p ∈ ∆(X). We will now argue
that, for all p, q ∈ ∆(X), we have p  q if and only if f ∗ ∗ g∗ for some f ∗, g∗ ∈ F∗ such
that γ−1(f ∗) = p and γ−1(g∗) = q. To see why, notice that if p  q, then we must have
f ∗ ′∗, hence f ∗ ∗ g∗. Conversely, suppose that we have f ∗ ∗ g∗ for some f ∗, g∗ ∈ F∗
such that γ−1(f ∗) = p and γ−1(g∗) = q, but q  p. But then, by definition of ′ we should
have g∗ ′∗, a contradiction.
Notice now that for every p ∈ ∆(X), if f ∗, g∗ ∈ γ(p), then we must have Vˆ (f ∗) = Vˆ (g∗):
the reason is, by construction of ′ we must have f ∗ ∼′∗, hence f ∗ ∼∗ g∗, hence Vˆ (f ∗) =
Vˆ (g∗). Define now V : ∆(X)→ R as V ∗(p) := Vˆ ∗(f ∗) for some f ∗ ∈ γ(p). By the previous
observation this is well defined. Now notice that we have p  q if and only if f ∗ ∗ g∗
for some f ∗, g∗ ∈ F∗ such that γ−1(f ∗) = p and γ−1(g∗) = q, which holds if and only if
Vˆ ∗(f ∗) ≥ Vˆ ∗(g∗), which in turns hold if and only if V ∗(p) ≥ V ∗(q), which means that V ∗
represents the restriction of  on ∆(X) as sought.
Claim 16. ∗ satisfies Arrow’s Monotone Continuity axiom. That is, for any f, g ∈ F∗ such
that f ∗ g, and for any x ∈ X and sequence of events in Σ∗ E1, . . . , En with E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ . . .
and ∩n≥1En = ∅, there exists n¯ ≥ 1 such that
xEn¯f ∗ g and f ∗ xEn¯g.
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Proof. Consider f, g, x, and E1, . . . as in the claim above. Notice first of all that for any
s ∈ Ω′, there must exist some nˆ such that for all n ≥ nˆ we have s /∈ En: otherwise, if this was
not true for some s ∈ Ω′, we would have s ∈ ∩n≥1En, a contradiction. In turn, this means
that we have xEnf → f pointwise: for any s ∈ Ω′, there must exist some n such that s /∈ En,
and therefore xEnf(s) = f(s) as sought. Notice then that by Claim 2, we must therefore
have that γ−1(xEnf) → γ−1(f). We now show that we must have some n¯1 ≥ 1 such that
xEn¯1f ∗ g for all n ≥ n¯1. Assume, by means of contradiction, that this is not the case: for
every n ≥ 1, there exists some n′ ≥ n such that g ∗ xE ′nf . Construct now the subsequence
of E1, . . . which includes these events, i.e. the events such that g ∗ xE ′n′f : by the previous
argument it must be a subsequence of E1, . . . and we must have that E
′
1 ⊆ E ′2 ⊆ . . . and
∩n≥1E ′n = ∅. This means that we have g ∗ xE ′nf for all n. By contruction this then means
that we have γ−1(g)  γ−1(xE ′nf). Now consider γ−1(xE ′nf), and notice that we have proved
above that γ−1(xE ′nf)→ γ−1(f) as n→∞. By Axiom 3 (Continuity), then, we must have
that γ−1(g)  γ−1(f), which in turns means that g ∗ f , a contradiction. An identical
argument shows that there must exist n¯2 ≥ 1 such that f ∗ xEn¯2g for all n ≥ n¯2. Any
n ≥ max{n1, n2} will therefore give us the desired rankings.
Claim 17. The measures in Φ are countably additive.
Proof. In Claim 16 we have showed that ∗ satisfies Arrow’s Monotone Continuity Axioms.
Using Theorem 1 in Chateauneuf et al. (2005) we can then show that Φ must be countably
additive.
Claim 18. The measures in Φ are atomless.
Proof. We will first of all follow a standard approach and define the likelihood ranking
induced by the ∗. In particular, define L on Σ∗ as
A L B ⇔ min
φ∈Φ
φ(A) ≥ min
φ∈Φ
φ(B).
Theorem 2 in Chateauneuf et al. (2005) show that every φ ∈ Φ is atomless if and only if
for all A ∈ Σ∗ such that A L ∅, there exists B ⊆ A such that A L B L ∅. A ∈ Σ∗
such that A L ∅, and notice that this implies that we have min
φ∈Φ
φ(A) > 0, hence φ(A) > 0
for all φ ∈ Φ. Since every φ ∈ Φ is mutually absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure, this implies `(A) > 0. Since ` is atomless, then there exists B ⊆ A such
that `(A) > `(B) > 0. Notice that this implies `(A\B) > 0. Again since all φ ∈ Φ are
mutually absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, we must therefore
have φ(A) > 0, φ(A\B) > 0 and φ(B) > 0 for all φ ∈ Φ. But this means that we have
φ(A) = φ(B)+φ(A\B) > φ(B) > 0 for all φ ∈ Φ. But this implies min
φ∈Φ
φ(A) > min
φ∈Φ
φ(B) > 0,
hence A L B L ∅ as sought.
Claim 19. The Lebesgue measure ` belongs to Φ.
Proof. Assume by means of contradiction that ` /∈ Φ. By the uniqueness of Φ, we know
that there must therefore exist some f ∈ F∗ such that Vˆ ∗(f) := min
p∈Φ
∫
[0,1]
u(f(s)) dp >∫
[0,1]
u(f(s)) d`. Call p1 a generic element of arg min
p∈Φ
∫
[0,1]
u(f(s)) dp. Notice that, since
32
∫
[0,1]
u(f ∗(s)) dp1 >
∫
[0,1]
u(f(s)) d`, it must be the case that p1(A) > `(A) for some A ⊂ [0, 1]
such that u(f(A)) >
∫
[0,1]
u(f ∗(s)) d`, and that p1(B) < `(B) for some B ⊂ [0, 1] such that
u(f(B)) < u(f(A)).
Suppose first of all that `(A) ≥ `(B). Now consider some f ′ ∈ F∗ constructed as
follows. Consider any C ⊆ A such that `(C) = `(B) and p1(C) > `(C). (This must be
possible since p1(A) > `(A).) Notice that we must therefore have p1(C) > p1(B) since
p1(C) > `(C) = `(B) > p1(B). Now construct the act f
′ as: f ′(s) = f(s) if s /∈ C ∪ B;
f ′(C) = f(B); and f ′(B) = f(A). (Notice that what we have done is that we have moved
the ‘bad’ outcomes to some events to which p1 assigns a likelihood above the Lebesgue
measure, while we have moved the ‘good’ outcomes to some event to which p1 assigns a
likelihood below the Lebesgue measure.) Notice now that, by construction, we must have
that f, f ′ ∈ γ(p) for some p ∈ ∆(X), hence we must have f ∼∗ f ′. At the same time,
since p1(C) > p1(B) and since u(f(B)) < u(f(A)) = u(f(C)), we must also have Vˆ
∗(f) =∫
[0,1]
u(f(s)) dp1 >
∫
[0,1]
u(f ′(s)) dp ≥ min
p∈Φ
∫
[0,1]
u(f ′(s)) dp = Vˆ ∗(f ′). But this means that
we have Vˆ ∗(f) > Vˆ ∗(f ′), hence f  f ′, contradicting f ∼∗ f ′. The proof for the case in
which `(A) < `(B) is specular.
Claim 20. All measures in Φ are mutually absolutely continuous, and, in particular, they
are all mutually absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure `.
Proof. To prove this, we will prove that for every event E in [0, 1], if E is null for ∗ if and
only if `(E) = 0.36 In turns this means that all measures are mutually absolutely continuous
with respect to each other.
Consider some measurable E ⊂ [0, 1] such that `(E) = 0. Suppose, by means of con-
tradiction, that {φ ∈ Φ : φ(E) > 0} 6= ∅. Then, consider any x, y ∈ X such that
δx  δy (which must exist by non-triviality), and construct the act yEx ∈ F∗. Since
{φ ∈ Φ : φ(E) > 0} 6= ∅, then we must have that min
φ∈Φ
φ(E)u(y) + (1 − φ(E))u(x) < u(x),
which in turns means that yEx ≺∗ x (by Claim 14), hence yEx ≺′ x. However, notice that,
since `(E) = 0, we must have that γ−1(yEx) = δx = γ−1(x). By construction of ′, then,
we must have yEx ∼′ x, contradicting yEx ≺′ x.
Consider now some measurable E ⊂ [0, 1] such that `(E) > 0. We now want to show that
φ(E) > 0 for all φ ∈ Φ. Suppose, by means of contradiction, that {φ ∈ Φ : φ(E) = 0} 6= ∅.
Then, consider any x, y ∈ X such that δx  δy (which must exist by non-triviality), and
construct the act xEy ∈ F∗. Since {φ ∈ Φ : φ(E) = 0} 6= ∅, then we must have that
min
φ∈Φ
φ(E)u(y) + (1− φ(E))u(x) = u(y), which in turns means that xEy ∼∗ y (by Claim 14),
hence xEy ∼′ y. However, notice that, since `(E) > 0, then γ−1(xEy)BFOSD γ−1(y), which
implies that we must have γ−1(xEy)  γ−1(y) by Axiom 2 (Monotonicity), which implies
xEy ′ y by construction of ′, contradicting xEy ∼′ y.
Claim 21. Φ is weak compact.
36Recall that in this case we can define null events by saying that an event E is null if and only if φ(E) = 0
for some φ ∈ Φ.
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Proof. We already know that Φ is weak∗ compact. At the same time, we also know that
every element in Φ is countably-additive: we can then apply Lemma 3 in Chateauneuf et al.
(2005) to prove the desired result. (Notice that this argument could be also derived from
standard Banach lattice techniques: as cited by Chateauneuf et al. (2005) one could follow
Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (2006), especially Section 4.2.)
Step 6. We now derive the main representations. First of all, define as Fˆ the subset of
acts in F ′ that are constant in the second component: Fˆ := {f ′ ∈ F ′ : f ′(ω, [0, 1]) = x for
some x ∈ X}. Define ˆ the restriction of  to Fˆ . Now notice that there exists a convex and
compact set of finitely additive probability measures Π on Σ, such that ˆ is represented by
the functional
Vˆ (fˆ) := min
pi∈Π
∫
Ω
pi(ω)u(fˆ(ω, [0, 1]))dω.
Moreover, Π is unique. Again, this trivially follows from Claim 13, where Π is the project
of P on Ω.
Claim 22. For any p ∈ ∆(X) there exists one x ∈ X such that δx ∼ p.
Proof. The claim trivially follows from Axiom 3 (Continuity) and Axiom 1 (FOSD).
By Claim 22 we know that ce(p) is well defined for all p ∈ ∆(X). Now, for any act f ,
construct the act f¯ ∈ F as f¯(ω) := δcef(ω) . Notice that for any f, g ∈ F , we must have
f  g if and only if f¯  g¯ by Axiom 2 (Monotonicity). At the same time, notice that, by
construction of γ, for every f ∈ F , |γ(f¯)| = 1 and γ(f¯)(ω, [0, 1]) = δcef(ω) . This means also
that γ(f¯) ∈ Fˆ for all f, g ∈ F . In turns, we must have that for all f, g ∈ F , f  g if and
only if γ(f¯) ′ γ(g¯), which is equivalent to γ(f¯)ˆγ(g¯), which we know is true if and only
if minpi∈Π
∫
Ω
pi(ω)u(γ(f¯)(ω, [0, 1]))dω ≥ minpi∈Π
∫
Ω
pi(ω)u(γ(f¯)(ω, [0, 1]))dω. At the same
time, we know that for each f ∈ F , we have that γ(f¯)(ω, [0, 1]) = δcef(ω) . In turns, this
means that we have
f  g ⇔ min
pi∈Π
∫
Ω
pi(ω)u(δcef(ω))dω ≥ minpi∈Π
∫
Ω
pi(ω)u(δceg(ω))dω.
At the same time, from Claim 15, we know that for all p ∈ ∆(X), u(cep) = V ∗(δcep) = V ∗(p),
where the first equality holds by construction of V ∗, while the second equality holds because
V ∗ represents the restriction of  to ∆(X) and because cep ∼ p for all p ∈ ∆(X). Given the
definition of V ∗ above, therefore, we obtain that  is represented by the functional
V (f) := min
pi∈Π
∫
Ω
pi(ω) min
φ∈Φ
|supp(p)|∑
i=1
φ([
i−1∑
j=1
p(xj),
i∑
j=1
p(xj)])u(xi)dω,
which is the desired representation. Finally, notice that, if  satisfies Axiom 7, then we
must have that ′ is such that for any f ′, g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ∼′ g′ we have 1
2
f ′⊕ 1
2
g′ ∼′ f ′.
But then, by Claim 13 we have that |P | = 1, which implies |Π| = |Φ| = 1. Moreover, since
` ∈ Φ, we must therefore have Φ = {`}.
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Proof of (2) ⇒ (3).
Consider a preference relation that admits a Multiple-Priors and Multiple Distortions repre-
sentation (u,Π,Φ). The proof will proceed with the following three steps: 1) starting from
a MP-MD representation, we will fix a measure-preserving function µ : ∆(X)→ [0, 1]X such
that it is, in some sense that we shall define below, monotone (in the sense that it assigns
better outcomes to higher states in [0, 1]); 2) we will prove that we can find an alternative
representation of  which is similar to a Multiple-Priors and Multiple Distortions represen-
tation with (u,Π,Φ′), but which holds only for the measure-preserving map defined-above,
and in which the set of priors Φ′ on [0, 1] is made only of ‘decreasing’ priors (they assign a
higher value to earlier states); 3) we will prove that this representation implies the existence
of a MP-MC-RDEU representation.
Step 1. Let us consider a measure-preserving function µ : ∆(X) → [0, 1]X with the
following two properties: for any p ∈ ∆(X) and for any x ∈ X, µ−1(x) is convex; for any
p ∈ ∆(X) and x, y ∈ supp(p), if δx  δy, then for any r ∈ µ−1(x) and s ∈ µ−1(y), we have
r > s. The idea is that µ maps lotteries into acts which in which the set of states that return
a given outcome is convex (first property), and such that the best outcomes are returned
always by higher states (in [0, 1]).
We now define a binary relation B on Φ as follows: for any φ, φ′ ∈ Φ, we have φBφ′ if,
and only if,
∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ ≤ ∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ′ for all p ∈ ∆(X). Notice that the relation B
depends on both u and µ; notice, moreover, that we have φBφ′ and φ′Bφ off φ = φ′, which
means that B is reflexive. Finally, notice that B is also transitive by construction.
Claim 23. B is upper-semicontinuous when B is metrized using the weak metric. That is,
for any (φm) ∈ Φ∞ and φ, φ′ ∈ Φ, if φm → φ′ weakly and φmBφ for all m, then φ′Bφ.
Proof. Suppose that we have φm, φ, and φ
′ as in the statement of the claim. This means
that for any p ∈ ∆(X) we have ∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφm ≤
∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ. Notice moreover that,
by construction of µ, there must exist x1, . . . , xn ∈ X and y0, . . . , yn ∈ [0, 1], where y0 = 0
and yn = 1, such that µ(p)(y) = xi off y ∈ [yi−1, yi] for i = 1, n. In turns, this means that
for any φ¯ ∈ Φ, we have ∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ¯ =
∑n
i=1 u(xi)φ¯([yi−1, yi]). This means that we have∑n
i=1 u(xi)φm([yi−1, yi]) ≤
∑n
i=1 u(xi)φ([yi−1, yi]). At the same time, recall that φ
′ is abso-
lutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure: this means that, by Portmanteau
Theorem37, since φm → φ′ weakly, then we must have that φm([yi−1, yi]) → φ′([yi−1, yi]) for
i = 1, . . . , n. But this means that we have
∑n
i=1 u(xi)φm([yi−1, yi])→
∑n
i=1 u(xi)φ
′([yi−1, yi]),
hence
∑n
i=1 u(xi)φ
′([yi−1, yi]) ≤
∑n
i=1 u(xi)φ([yi−1, yi]), so
∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ′ ≤ ∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ.
Since this must be true for any p ∈ ∆(X), we therefore have φ′Bφ as sought.
Step 2. Now define the set
MAX(Φ, B) := {φ ∈ Φ : @φ′ ∈ Φ s.t. φ′Bφ and φ′ 6= φ}.
Claim 24. MAX(Φ, B) 6= ∅.
37See (Billingsley, 1995, Chapter 5).
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Proof. Since Φ is weak compact and B is upper-semi-continuous (in the weak metric), then
standard results in order theory show that MAX(Φ, B) 6= ∅: see for example Theorem 3.2.1
in Ok (2011).
Claim 25. For any p ∈ ∆(X) we have min
φ∈MAX(Φ,B)
∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ = min
φ∈Φ
∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ
Proof. Since by construction MAX(Φ, B) ⊆ Φ, it trivially follows that the right hand side of
the equation is smaller or equal than the left hand side for all p ∈ ∆(X). We are left to prove
the converse. To this end, say by means of contradiction that there exists some p ∈ ∆(X)
and some φˆ ∈ Φ\MAX(Φ, B) such that ∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφˆ < min
φ∈MAX(Φ,B)
∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ. This
means that we cannot have φ′Bφˆ for any φ′ ∈ MAX(Φ, B). Since B is transitive, we must
therefore have that φˆ ∈ MAX(Φ, B), a contradiction.
Finally, define the set
Φ′ := {φ ∈ MAX(Φ, B) : φ ∈ arg min
φ∈MAX(Φ,B)
∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ for some p ∈ ∆(X)}.
We now define the notion of state-decreasing priors.
Definition 8. A prior φ on [0, 1] is state-decreasing if there are do not exist any x1, x2, x3, x4
s.t. x1 < x2 < x3 < x4, `([x1, x2]) = `([x3, x4]) and pi([x1, x2]) < pi([x3, x4]).
Claim 26. Every prior φ ∈ Φ′ is state-decreasing.
Proof. Suppose by means of contradiction that there exists φ′ ∈ Φ′ which is not state-
decreasing. This means that there exist x1, x2, x3, x4 s.t. x1 < x2 < x3 < x4, `([x1, x2]) =
`([x3, x4]) and φ
′([x1, x2]) < φ′([x3, x4]). Now notice the following. If we have a MP-MD
representation, then for any measure preserving map µ′ : ∆(X)→ [0, 1]X we must have
min
φ∈Φ
∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ = u(cep) = min
φ∈Φ
∫
[0,1]
u(µ′(p))dφ
for all p ∈ ∆(X), for any cep ∈ X such that δcep ∼ p. Since this must be true for every
measure preserving µ′ and for every p, then there must exist some φˆ ∈ Φ such that φ′(A) =
φˆ(A) for all A ⊂ [0, 1] such that A ∩ ([x1, x2] ∪ [x3, x4] = ∅, and φˆ([x1, x2]) = φ′([x3, x4])
and ˆphi([x3, x4]) = φ
′([x1, x2]): the reason is, if we take a measure preserving map µ′ which
is identical to µ except that it maps to [x3, x4] whatever µ maps to [x1, x2], and vice-versa,
then there must exist a prior which minimizes the utility when µ′ is used, and which returns
exactly the same utility. Now notice that we must have that, by construction, φ′([x1, x2]) <
φ′([x3, x4]), and hence φˆ([x1, x2]) > φˆ([x3, x4]), where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4, `([x1, x2]) =
`([x3, x4]). (The two priors are otherwise the same.) But since µ assigns prizes with a higher
utility to higher states, then this means that we have∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφˆ ≤
∫
[0,1]
u(µ(p))dφ′
for all p ∈ ∆(X). Since φˆ 6= φ′, therefore, we have that φˆBφ′, which contradicts the fact
that φ′ ∈ Φ′ ⊆ MAX(Φ, B).
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This analysis leads us to the following claim:
Claim 27. There exists a closed, weak compact subset Π′′ of priors on [0, 1] such that every
φ ∈ Φ is state-decreasing, atom less, mutually absolutely continuous with respect to ` such
that  is represented by
V (f) := min
pi∈Π
∫
Ω
pi(ω)U¯(f(ω))dω
where U¯ : ∆(X)→ R is defined as
U¯(p) = min
φ∈Φ′′
∫
[0,1]
φ(s)u(µ(p))ds.
(Here u,Π and µ are defined above.)
Proof. Simply define the set Φ′′ as the closed convex hull of Φ′. Notice that this operation
maintains the property that every φ in it is state-decreasing, and that it represents the
preferences. Therefore, the result follows from Claim 25 and 26 .
Step 3. Consider now the representation in Claim 27, and for every φ ∈ Φ′′ construct first
the corresponding probability density function (PDF), pdfφ. Notice that pdfφ is well-defined
since every φ is mutually absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (this
follows from the Radon-Nikodym Theorem, (Aliprantis and Border, 2005, Theorem 13.18)).
Moreover, notice that since every φ ∈ Φ′′ is state-decreasing, then every pdfφ is a decreasing
function in [0, 1]. Moreover, since every φ ∈ Φ is mutually absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure, then pdfφ is never flat at zero. For each φ ∈ φ′′, construct now
the corresponding cumulative distribution function, and call the set of them Ψ. Notice that
every ψ ∈ Ψ must be concave, strictly increasing, and differentiable functions – because the
corresponding PDFs exist, are decreasing, and never flat at zero. We are left to show that
Ψ is point-wise compact: but this follows trivially from the standard result that for any two
distributions φ, φ′ on [0, 1] with corresponding CDFs ψ and ψ′ such that both are continuous
on [0, 1], we have that φ → φ′ weakly if, and only if, ψ → ψ′ pointwise.38 The desired
representation then follows trivially.
Proof of (3) ⇒ (1).
We start by proving the necessity of Axiom 3 (Continuity). For brevity in what follows we
will only prove that if  admits the representation in (3), then for any (pn) ∈ (∆(X))∞, and
for any p, q ∈ ∆(X), if pn  q for all n and if pn → p (in the topology of weak convergence),
then p  q. The proof for the specular case in which pn  q for all n is identical, while
the extension to non-constant acts follows by standard arguments once the convergence for
constant acts is enstablished. To avoid confusion, we denote pn →w p to indicate weak
convergence, fn →p f to denote point-wise convergence, and → to indicate convergence in
R.
Claim 28. Consider ψn ∈ Ψ∞, ψ ∈ Ψ, pn ∈ ∆(X)∞, p ∈ ∆(X) such that ψn →p ψ and
pn →w p. Then RDEUu,ψn(pn)→ RDEUu,ψ(p).
38This is a standard result. See, for example, the discussion on (Billingsley, 1995, Chapter 5).
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Proof. Consider ψn ∈ Ψ∞, ψ ∈ Ψ, pn ∈ ∆(X)∞, and p ∈ ∆(X) as in the statement of the
Claim. (What follows is an adaptation of the Proofs in (Chateauneuf, 1999, Remark 9) to
our case.) Notice that since X is a connected and compact set, and since u is continuous,
we can assume wlog u(X) = [0, 1]. Also, for any t ∈ [0, 1], define At := {x ∈ X : u(x) > t}.
Then, notice that for any p ∈ ∆(X) and ψ ∈ Ψ we have
RDEUu,ψ(p) =
∫ 1
0
ψ(p(At))dt.
Define now Hn, H : [0, 1] → [0, 1] by Hn(t) = ψn(pn(At)) and H(t) = ψ(p(At)). We then
have RDEUu,ψn(pn) =
∫ 1
0
Hn(t)dt and RDEUu,ψ(p) =
∫ 1
0
H(t)dt. Since |Hn(t)| ≤ 1 for all
t ∈ [0, 1] and for all n, then by the Dominated Convergence Theorem (see (Aliprantis and
Border, 2005, Theorem 11.21)) to prove that RDEUu,ψn(pn) → RDEUu,ψ(p) we only need
to show that Hn(t)→ H(t) for almost all t ∈ [0, 1]. To do this, we denote Mp := {r ∈ [0, 1] :
∃x ∈ supp(p) such that u(x) = r}, and we will show that we have Hn(t) → H(t) for all
t ∈ [0, 1]\Mp: since p is a simple lottery (with therefore finite support), this will be enough.
Consider some t ∈ [0, 1]\Mp, and notice that we must have that At is a continuity set of p.
To see why, notice that, since u is continuous, At must be open, and we have that δAt = {x ∈
X : u(x) = t}; and since t /∈Mt, then we must have p(δAt) = 0. By Portmanteau Theorem39
we then have pn(At) → p(At). We will now argue that for any such t we must also have
Hn(t) → H(t), which will conclude the argument. To see why, consider any t ∈ [0, 1]\Mp,
and notice that we must have |Hn(t) − H(t)| = |ψn(pn(At)) − ψ(p(At))| < |ψn(pn(At)) −
ψn(p(At))|+|ψn(p(At))−ψ(p(At))|. At the same time: |ψn(pn(At))−ψn(p(At))| can be made
arbitrarily small since pn(At)→ p(At) and ψn is continuous; and |ψn(p(At))−ψ(p(At))| can
be made arbitrarily small since ψn →p ψ. But then, we must have Hn(t)→ H(t) as sought.
Notice, therefore, that we can apply standard generalizations of Berge’s Theorem of the
maximum, such as (Aliprantis and Border, 2005, Theorem 17.13),40 and therefore prove that
Axiom 3 (Continuity).
Next, we turn to prove the necessity of Axiom 6 (Hedging). To this end, let us define the
notion of enumeration.
Definition 9. A simple enumeration of a lottery q is a step function x : [0, 1] → X such
that l({z ∈ [0, 1]|f(z) = w} = q(w) ∀ w ∈ supp(q).
Let N(x) ∈ N be the number of steps in x, and xn be the value of f(x) at each step, and
px(xn) be the Lesbegue measure of each step xn.
Claim 29. Let p be some lottery, and x, y be two simple enumerations of p such that
xi−1  xi for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, if ψ is a concave RDU functional and u is a utility
39See (Billingsley, 1995, Chapter 5).
40In particular, in our case the correspondence ρ in the statement of the theorem would be constant and
equal to Ψ, which is non-empty and compact, while the function f in the statement of the theorem would
correspond to the function RDEUu,ψ(p) seen as a function of both ψ and p – which, as we have seen, is
continuous.
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function that represents , we have
W (x) = ψ(px(x1))u(x1) +
N(x)∑
i=2
(
ψ(
i∑
j=1
px(xj))− ψ(
i−1∑
j=1
px(xj))
)
u(xi)
≤ ψ(py(y1))u(y1) +
N(y)∑
i=2
(
ψ(
i∑
j=1
py(yj))− ψ(
i−1∑
j=1
py(yj))
)
u(yi) = W (y).
Proof. We begin by proving the claim for cases in which py map to rational numbers, then
extend the claim using the continuity of W . As py(yi) is rational, for all.i ∈ 1..N(y) we
can write each py(yi) =
mi
ni
for some set of integers {mi} and {ni}. This means that there
are a set of natural numbers {ki} such that py(yi) = ki∏ni . Notice that we can rewrite the
step function y as a different step function y¯ defined by the intervals
{
[ j∏
ni
, j+1∏
ni
)
}∏ni−1
j=0
,
where the value of the function in the interval [ j∏
ni
, j+1∏
ni
) is equal to the value of y in the
interval [py(yl), p
y(ym) where l = max
{
t ∈ N|py(yt) ≤ j∏ni
}
and min
{
t ∈ N|py(yt) ≥ j+1∏ni
}
.
In other words, we have split the original step function y up into a finite number of equally
spaced steps, while preserving the value of the original function (again we can do this because
the original function had steps defined by rational number). We can therefore now think
of y¯ as consisting of a finite numer of equally lengthed elements that can be interchanged
using the procedure we discuss below Note that redefining y in this way does not change the
function - i.e. y(t) = y¯(t) ∀ t, and nor does it affect its utility - i.e. W (y) = W (y¯).
Now order the steps of y¯ using , breaking ties arbitrarily. Let y¯1 denote the worst step
of y¯, y¯2 the next worst element and so on. We next define a sequence of enumerations and
functions recursively:
1. Let 1y¯ = y¯. Define the function 1r : {1...N(y)} → N such that 1r(j) is the original
position of y¯j for all j (i.e. 1r(j) =
{
n ∈ N|1y¯ir(j) = y¯j
}
)
2. Define iy¯ as
iy¯(t) = y¯i for t ∈ [i− 1∏
ni
,
i∏
ni
)
= i−1y¯i for t ∈ [
i−1r(i)− 1∏
ni
,
i−1r(i)∏
ni
)
= i=1y¯(t) otherwise
Define ir(j) as the position of yj in iy¯ for all j (i.e. ir(j) =
{
n ∈ N|iy¯ir(j) = y¯j
}
)
So, at each stage, this procedure takes the previous function, looks for the ith worst step
of y¯ and switches it into the ith position in the enumeration (while moving whatever was
in that slot back to where the worst element came from. The function ir keeps track of the
location of each of the steps of y¯ in each iteration i. The first thing to note is that the
final element in this sequence,
∏
ni y¯, is equivalent to x, in the sense that W (x) = W (
∏
ni y¯):
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Clearly, each of these switches preserve the Lesbegue measure associated to each prize, thus∏
ni y¯ is an enumeration of p. Furthermore
∏
ni y¯i−1 
∏
ni y¯i for all i by construction, meaning
that u(
∏
ni y¯(t)) = u(x(t)) for all t.
Next, we show that W (iy) ≤ W (i−1y) for all i ∈ {2, ..∏ni} First, note that it must be
the case that i−1y¯i  y¯i: in words, the ith worst element of y¯ must be weakly worse than
whatever is in the ith slot in i−1y¯. To see this, note that, if this were not the case, then it
must be the case that i−1y¯i = y¯j for some j < i. But, by the iterative procedure, y¯j must be
in slot i−1y¯j 6=i−1 y¯i.
Next, note that it must be the case that i−1r(i) ≥ i. By the iterative procedure, for all
j < i, i−1y¯j = y¯j 6= y¯i. Thus, as i−1r(i) is the location of y¯i in i−1y¯j, it must be the case that
i−1r(i) ≥ i.
Next, note that iy and i−1y differ only on the intervals [ i−1∏
ni
, i∏
ni
) and [
i−1r(i)−1∏
ni
,
i−1r(i)∏
ni
).
Thus, we can write the difference between W (iy) and W (i−1y) as
W (iy)−W (i−1y) =
(
ψ(
i∑
j=1
p(iyj)− ψ(
i−1∑
j=1
p(iyj))
)
(u(i−1y¯i)− u(y¯i))
+
ψ( r(i)∑
j=1
p(iyj)− ψ(
r(i)−1∑
j=1
p(iyj))
 (u(y¯i)− u(i−1y¯i))
=
(
ψ
(
i∏
ni
)
− ψ
(
i− 1∏
ni
))
(u(i−1y¯i)− u(y¯i)) +(
ψ
(
i−1r(i)∏
ni
)
− ψ
(
i−1r(i)− 1∏
ni
))
(u(y¯i)− u(i−1y¯i))
=
((
ψ
(
i∏
ni
)
− ψ
(
i− 1∏
ni
))
−
(
ψ
(
i−1r(i)∏
ni
)
− ψ
(
i−1r(i)− 1∏
ni
)))
×(u(i−1y¯i)− u(y¯i)).
Now, as i−1y¯i  y¯i, it must be the case that u(i−1y¯i) ≥ u(y¯i), and so (u(i−1y¯i)−u(y¯i)) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, it must be the case that the term in the first parentheses is also weakly positive
by the concavity of ψ. To see this, define a new function
ψ¯(x) = ψ
(
x+
i− 1∏
ni
)
− ψ
(
i− 1∏
ni
)
.
This is a concave function with ψ¯ ≥ 0, and so is subadditive. This means that
ψ¯
(
i−1r(i)∏
ni
− i− 1∏
ni
)
≤ ψ¯
(
i−1r(i)− 1∏
ni
− i− 1∏
ni
)
+ψ¯
((
i−1r(i)∏
ni
− i− 1∏
ni
)
−
(
i−1r(i)− 1∏
ni
− i− 1∏
ni
))
= ψ¯
(
i−1r(i)− 1∏
ni
− i− 1∏
ni
)
+ ψ¯
(
1∏
ni
)
.
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By substituting back for the original function gives
ψ
(
i−1r(i)∏
ni
)
≤ ψ
(
i−1r(i)− 1∏
ni
)
+ ψ
(
i∏
ni
)
− ψ
(
i− 1∏
ni
)
⇒ ψ
(
i−1r(i)∏
ni
)
− ψ
(
i−1r(i)− 1∏
ni
)
≤ ψ
(
i∏
ni
)
− ψ
(
i− 1∏
ni
)
.
Thus, by iteration we have W (y) = W (y¯) = W (1y¯) ≥ W (∏ni y¯(t)) = W (x) and we are
done.
To extend the proof to enumerations with irrational p functions, take such a function y,
and associated x that is the rank order enumeration of y, whereby py(yi) is not guaranteed
to be rational for all i ∈ 1...N(y). Now note that py is a vector in RN(y). Note that I
can construct a sequence of vectors qi ∈ QN(y) such that {qi} → py. Define the simple
enumeration yi as the step function whereby yi(t) = yn for t ∈ [
∑n−1
j=0 q
i
i−1,
∑n
j=0 q
i
i−1). The
utility of the enumeration yi is given by
W (yi) = ψ(qi1)u(y1) +
N()y∑
k=2
(
ψ(
k∑
j=0
qii−1))− ψ(
k−1∑
j=0
qii−1)
)
u(yk).
As qij → py(yj), and as ψ is continuous, then it must be the case that W (yi) → W (y).
Similarly, if we let xi be the rank enumeration of yi, then it must be the case that W (xi)→
W ((x). Thus, if it were the case that W (y) > W (x), then there would be some i such that
W (yi) > W (xi). But as yi is rational, this contradicts the above result.
We now turn to prove that the Axiom 6 is satisfied. Again we will prove this only for
degenerate acts – the extension to the general case being trivial. Let p, q be two lotteries
such that p ∼ q and r ∈ ⊕12p,q . Let x be the enumeration of r, then there must be two
enumerations zx and zy such that
1. zi =
1
2
zxi ⊕ 12zyi for all i;
2. for every xi,
∑
i|zxi =xi r(zi) = p(xi) and
∑
i|zyi =yi r(zi) = p(yi);
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Now, the utility of r is given by
U(r) = min
pi∈Π
∑
i
(
pi
(
i−1∑
j=0
r(zj)
)
− pi
(
i∑
j=0
r(zj)
))
u(zi)
= min
pi∈Π
∑
i
(
pi
(
i−1∑
j=0
r(zj)
)
− pi
(
i∑
j=0
r(zj)
))(
1
2
(u(zxi ) + u(z
y
i ))
)
= min
pi∈Π
[
1
2
(∑
i
(
pi
(
i−1∑
j=0
r(zj)
)
− pi
(
i∑
j=0
r(zj)
))
u(zxi )
)
+
1
2
(∑
i
(
pi
(
i−1∑
j=0
r(zj)
)
− pi
(
i∑
j=0
r(zj)
))
u(zyi )
)
]
≥ 1
2
min
pi∈Π
(∑
i
(
pi
(
i−1∑
j=0
r(zj)
)
− pi
(
i∑
j=0
r(zj)
))
u(zxi )
)
+
1
2
min
pi∈Π
(∑
i
(
pi
(
i−1∑
j=0
r(zj)
)
− pi
(
i∑
j=0
r(zj)
))
u(zy)
)
Note that the enumerations are not in rank order, but, by Claim 29, reordering can only
decrease the utility of the enumeration by shuﬄing them into the rank order for every pi ∈ Π.
Let z¯x and z¯y be the rank order enumerations of zx. We must then have
U(r) ≥ 1
2
min
pi∈Π
(∑
i
(
pi
(
i−1∑
j=0
r(zj)
)
− pi
(
i∑
j=0
r(zj)
))
u(zxi )
)
+
1
2
min
pi∈Π
(∑
i
(
pi
(
i−1∑
j=0
r(zj)
)
− pi
(
i∑
j=0
r(zj)
))
u(zy)
)
≥ 1
2
min
pi∈Π
(∑
i
(
pi
(
i−1∑
j=0
r(zj)
)
− pi
(
i∑
j=0
r(zj)
))
u(z¯xi )
)
+
1
2
min
pi∈Π
(∑
i
(
pi
(
i−1∑
j=0
r(zj)
)
− pi
(
i∑
j=0
r(zj)
))
u(z¯yi )
)
=
1
2
U(p) +
1
2
U(q)
as sought.
We now turn to Axiom 1 (FOSD). Let pi be a continuous RDEU functional. We know
(e.g. (Wakker, 1994, Theorem 12,)) that it respects FOSD. Thus, suppose that p first order
stochastically dominates q, and let pi∗ ∈ Π be the functional that minimizes the utility of
p. We know that the utility of q under this functional has to be lower than the utility of p,
thus the utility of q (which is assessed under the functional that minimazes the utility of q)
is lower than that of p
Finally, Axiom 2 (Monotonicity) and Axiom 5 (Degenerate Independence) follow form
standard arguments, while Axiom 4 follows from Lemma 1.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Notice first of all that both 1 and 2 we can follow Steps from 1 to 4 of the proof of
Theorem 1, and obtain two preference relation ′1 and ′2 on F ′, both of which admit a
representation as in Claim 13 of the form (u′1, P
′
1) and (u
′
2, P
′
2). Notice, moreover, that we
must have u′1 = u1 and u
′
2 = u2, and we must also have, by construction, P
′
1 = Π1 × Φ1 and
P ′2 = Π2 × Φ2.
Suppose now that we have that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1. Then, we
must have ⊕1 = ⊕2 , which implies that u1 is a positive affine transformation of u2.
But this means that u′1 is a positive affine transformation of u
′
2, which means that, since
both ′1 and ′2 are biseparable and have essential events (as proved in the steps from the
proof of Theorem 1), then by (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002, Proposition 6) ′1 and ′2
are cardinally symmetric. Moreover, since 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1, it
is easy to see that we must have that ′2 is more uncertainty averse than ′1 in the sense
of (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002, Definition 4). We can then apply (Ghirardato and
Marinacci, 2002, Theorem 17), and obtain that we must have P ′2 ⊇ P ′1. Since P ′1 = Π1 × Φ1
and P ′2 = Π2 × Φ2, this implies Π2 ⊇ Π1 and Φ2 ⊇ Φ1.
Now suppose that we have Π2 ⊇ Π1, Φ2 ⊇ Φ1, and that u1 is a positive affine transfor-
mation of u2. This first of all implies ⊕1 = ⊕2 . Moreover, it also implies that u′1 is a
positive affine transformation of u′2, and we must have P
′
2 ⊇ P ′1. Again by (Ghirardato and
Marinacci, 2002, Theorem 17) we then have that ′2 is more uncertainty averse than ′1 in
the sense of (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002, Definition 4), which implies that 2 is more
attracted to certainty than 1, as sought.
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